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“If you can’t count it, it doesn’t count.” 
Holsti, 1969 (Holme, Solvang, 2004) 
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Abstract 
 
Risk analysis in the oil industry is used to identify and address the risks that are involved in a certain 
situation, on for instance a platform. Risk analyses have a long history in the oil and gas industry, and 
have been a vital part of the entire lifecycle of any project in this industry.  
 
The content of the risk analysis consists of risk identification and calculation, and recommended risk 
reducing measures that can be implemented to reduce the risk to ALARP. The purpose of this thesis 
is to discuss how risk and risk reducing measures are identified and addressed in a risk analysis 
process. To be able to prepare and deliver a risk analysis, regulations determined by the authorities 
shall be followed and standards can be used as guidance. This thesis also looks at the regulations and 
standards that are present in risk analyses and in which way the risk analysis fulfils the criteria.  
 
Literature review, study of three different case studies and informal interviews, have been 
performed and evaluated to determine how risk and risk reducing measures are identified and 
addressed in risk analyses. The three case studies use quantitative-, concept- and total risk analysis, 
in different stages of the life cycle in a platform. The risk analyses for the three case studies have 
been evaluated and compared, with respect to the regulations and standards. Furthermore, potential 
improvements have been suggested to implement in a risk analysis. It is evaluated, from the case 
studies used in this thesis, that risk and risk reducing measures often are based on traditional 
approaches as well as implemented data from statistics and previous case studies. The underlying 
understanding regarding risk and risk reducing measures are often not presented in risk analyses nor 
are the uncertainties and causes of given activities. 
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Introduction  
 
Risk is wherever we are; it is present in every activity or event we are a part of. Risk itself is neither 
bad nor good. It is the measure of deviation that is given from what is expected. The consequences 
on the other hand, can be bad or good. Risk related to people is the most crucial risk that we can be 
exposed to, especially in the oil industry. The risk on for instance a platform offshore is high both for 
personnel, the assets and the environment; the consequences can be fatal. Thus, risk can differ from 
fire and explosion danger to risk related to getting your finger cut or falling. Risk analysis is the 
process of dealing with uncertainty and trying to mitigate the consequences of the risk and 
uncertainty occurring. A risk analysis is often used as a tool for decision making (Aven, Vinnem, 
2007). Therefore, identifying and assessing risk is important in order to analyze potential 
consequences. Risk reducing measures can be determined to mitigate the consequences and reduce 
the risk involved as low as reasonably practicable.  
 
Risk analysis is used on a daily basis in the oil industry, both offshore and onshore. New platforms, 
modifications of existing platforms or extensions involve risk that can harm people, assets and the 
environment. Through preparing a risk analysis, the hazards and risks that are involved are identified 
and determined. The risk analysis process differs, depending on the operating company as well as on 
the company preparing the risk analysis, but has to be in relation to the regulations that have been 
determined by the authorities. Preparing a risk analysis is necessary for determining the risk that is 
involved through setting risk acceptance criteria to be able to determine risk reducing measures. 
After the Piper Alpha accident, risk analyses have been applied in specific parts of the design, 
maintenance and modification processes. Risk analyses have been used as a decision making tool for 
determining and identifying risk involved in certain activities (Brandsæter, 2002). If a risk analysis had 
been performed for Piper Alpha, the decision of not installing blast walls between the oil separation 
units would have been analysed as a high risk decision. A risk analysis would have shown that the 
probability and consequences would have been very high. As result of implementing risk analysis in 
the oil industry, better decisions have been made and risks have been identified, addressed and 
reduced. However, the risk analysis process needs constant improvements regarding risk and risk 
reducing measures through learning from previous accidents and activities.     
 
The risk analysis process and approach for identifying risk is often based on experience and the 
process can always be modified and improved depending on the elements that need to be evaluated. 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and present how risk and risk reducing measures are 
identified an addressed in quantitative-, concept- and total risk analysis. Providing a literature review 
and theoretical background related to risk and risk reducing measures in the oil industry is in place 
and case studies have been used to help determine the purpose of this thesis. Three different case 
studies have been used that represent how risk analyses are presented for operating companies in 
Norway. Through, literature review, comparing and reviewing case studies, a discussion and analysis 
will be performed to indicate whether the risk and risk reducing measures in a risk analysis comply 
with the regulations and standards. Regulations have been determined by the Norwegian Petroleum 
Safety Authority (PSA) which the oil industry shall follow. Standards, as NORSOK- and ISO standards, 
can contribute as guidance when following regulations; they have also been analyzed with respect to 
how they are used in risk analysis when identifying risk and risk reducing measures. Therefore, the 
risk analysis shall contain the requirements that have been determined by the authorities and this 
thesis will evaluate whether the requirements have been followed in the risk analyses. In addition, 
research has been performed to determine further potential improvements that can be 
implemented to ameliorate the process of risk analysis.  
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 Problem statement and research question 
 
The main focus for companies related to the oil industry, and for that matter with other industries as 
well, is to analyse risk and the consequences related to exposure to a certain risk. Though most 
companies have defined their views and limits on risk through risk acceptance criteria, risk 
identification and risk reducing measures also need to be analyzed and determined.  
 
The risk reducing measures will contribute in reducing the risk, and thus the consequences. Through 
the risk analysis process, risk and risk reducing measures are identified and determined. It is 
interesting to analyse the risk concept that is used in quantitative risk analysis and how the risk 
picture and understanding of risk contributes to determining the risk reducing measures. When 
having the understanding and picture of how risk is defined, the understanding of safety to for 
instance the personnel or environment can be determined.  
 
The main scope of this thesis is to analyse how risk and risk reducing measures in the context of risk 
management in quantitative risk analysis has been presented for maintenance and modification 
projects. The research questions in this thesis can thus be defined as: 
 
“How are ‘risk’ and ‘risk reducing measures’ identified and addressed in risk analyses when 
analyzing case studies based on quantitative-, concept- and total risk analysis?”  
 
“How can the content of a risk analysis be improved with regards to the identification and 
presentation of ‘risk’ and ‘risk reducing measures’?” 
 
These two research questions are closely linked.  The presentation of risk and risk reducing measures 
will be analysed and addressed and, if possible and if needed, improvement potentials will be 
introduced to help improve risk analyses. By identifying and answering these questions, the risk 
analysis process will be much clearer, as well as how risk and risk reducing measures are identified 
and addressed in risk analysis processes. The risk and risk reducing measures, and how they are 
identified and determined, will differ depending on the risk analysis. The risk analyses used in this 
thesis are a related to quantitative-, concept- and total risk analysis of a platform, in the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf. 
  
When an operating company needs a risk analysis of a platform or of a modification process, other 
consulting companies specialized in preparing quantitative risk analysis are used. However, the 
companies that are preparing the risk analyses have their own perception on risk, which they use in 
accordance with the risk perception from the operating company. This risk perception is then the 
underlying understanding that is used for the risk analysis. Also, regulations and standards are used 
in the process of identifying and addressing risk and risk reducing measures. It is fascinating to 
evaluate how companies use and present the term ‘risk’ and how it is further used in determining the 
risk reducing measures for quantitative-, concept- and total risk analysis . This thesis is set to 
evaluate the risk concept and how it is identified and used when determining and identifying the risk 
reducing measures. One of the main interests is whether the three risk analyses for the three cases 
satisfy and comply with the requirements set by the authorities. In addition, the risk analyses are 
different (quantitative-, concept-, and total risk analysis) and thus have different approaches and are 
prepared in different stages. It is important to identify their differences and whether they lack 
information or identification of certain aspects that should be in a risk analysis.  
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The case studies are: 
 
 Case 1: Quantitative Risk Analysis for Gudrun-tie-in to the Sleipner platform 
 Case 2: Total Risk Analysis for the Sleipner platform 
 Case 3: Concept Risk Analysis for the installation of pre-compressor on the Troll A platform  
 
Even though these risk analyses types differ in content and usage, the risk perception and the 
underlying understanding of risk and of the risk reducing measures is the main focus. It is interesting 
to evaluate how the three case studies identify risk and risk reducing measures, how they address 
these terms and how they are used. By comparing the three different risk analysis types the result 
can illustrate the usage of the risk analysis for determining the risk perception as well as determining 
the risk reducing measures. The three case studies represent typical case studies that are used in 
Norway by consulting companies that deliver these risk analysis documents to the operating 
company. Therefore, the result of how risk and risk reducing measures are identified and addressed 
in these three cases will give an overall indication of how the risk is identified and presented in the oil 
industry.  
  
To recap; this thesis will study risk analyses with respect to the regulations and standards that shall 
be fulfilled, to evaluate: 
 
 The risk concept and identification of risk (how is risk understood, analysed and presented in 
risk analyses) 
 The presentation and development of risk reducing measures 
 
Research purpose  
 
The aim for this research is to identify how risk and risk reducing measures are identified in risk 
analysis processes. Through this research data and documents have been evaluated and analyzed to 
determine how the terms risk and risk reducing measures for the three case studies have been 
identified and addressed in the risk analysis. 
 
The three case studies used in this thesis will give an overall illustration of how the term risk is 
defined in the quantitative-, concept- and total risk analysis that have been used.  The term risk, 
especially in petroleum related activities, is very important to be defined. Through identifying risk 
and risk reducing measures, the safety of the personnel and the environment can be illustrated. 
Through risk analysis, risk can be identified, the potential consequences can be evaluated and the 
priorities for measures and actions can be determined. By determining and identifying risk, the 
measures can be determined to reduce the consequence of the risk as much as possible. Following a 
brief introduction on the three case studies, a discussion is performed to obtain total view on how 
risk and risk reducing measures have been illustrated. The main purpose of the thesis is thus to 
illustrate how risk analysis uses the terms risk and risk reducing measures in different risk analysis 
and whether there is potential for improvement.    
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The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority has set regulations that shall be followed in the oil 
companies. A risk analysis shall go through the regulations and the recommendations to satisfy the 
authorities and retain their license to operate. Standards are recommended to follow the regulations 
that are set. Thus, the thesis will also analyse whether the risk analysis comply with the regulations 
and the standards used. Through complying with the regulations and the standards that are used, 
this will contribute to the risk analysis for developing the risk concept and identifying risk and risk 
reduction measures. 
 
The three case studies are used to determine if the approach used in the risk analysis, to identify and 
address risk and risk reducing measures, is effective. This will be evaluated by determining whether 
the three risk analysis fulfil the requirements and regulations set by the authorities and how the risk 
analysis determines and identifies the risks involved in a platform. In addition, theoretical overview 
has been established to compare the understanding from the literature review with the 
understanding of the risk analyses. This is done in different stages of a platform live cycle: 
 
- The quantitative risk analysis for Case I has the focus on risk involving an extension of a 
platform 
- The total risk analysis for Case II focus on the risk involved for an (entire) existing platform 
- The concept risk analysis for Case III focuses on the risk that is involved when a platform is 
modified   
 
Limitations of the research  
 
The main limitation regarding this research is associated with the risk analyses that have been used. 
The analyses are related to three case studies for offshore platforms. The three cases are of 
quantitative risk analysis methods, but the fact that they differ in being concept-, quantitative- or 
total risk analysis has not been explained in detail or what they contain. The first case study is a 
quantitative risk analysis of a tie-in; the second case study is on the total risk analysis of a platform, 
while the third case study evaluates the concept of a pre-compressor that will be added to a 
platform. The presentation of risk and risk reducing measures is of main interest, not what type of 
method was used and why that was used. The main focus is on how the terms risk and risk reducing 
measures have been identified and further assessed in the three risk analysis that are evaluated for 
the three case studies. Thus, the thesis is limited to three case studies, more case studies could have 
been used to stress the risk concept and the identification of risk and risk reduction process.  
 
In addition, the main focus is on risk related to the personnel, not the assets or the environment. The 
risk analysis contains sub analysis like fire and explosion analysis, escape routes, fatalities etc. to 
determine the risk involved on the platform. Examples from the risk analyses that are related to risk 
have been given; these examples are related to the fire and explosion analysis. The examples are 
restricted and are only given as an indication of how the risk analysis presents risk and risk reducing 
measures. Since the risk analysis is comprehensive, only very few tables and examples have been 
used from the documents. Also, the presented regulations, guidelines and standards are limited to 
the ones that are considered as the most important and relevant ones, related to the risk analyses 
for the case studies.  
   
No further analysis has been done regarding the cost and benefits of implementing the measures 
that have been proposed or the benefits of them. Whether the actual risk reducing measures have 
been implemented (the recommended measures in the risk analysis) for the three cases have not 
been followed up.  
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Research approach and Methodology  
 
During the process of writing this thesis, increased interaction between the literature (theory) and 
case studies established the analyse process of this research to determine the research questions. 
The relationship and lack of relationship between the interactions create an increase in literature 
search, while writing the thesis more research and literature had to be collected. By being able to 
adapt information from different angles, the research question is better approached (Holme, 
Solvang, 1996).   
 
This thesis is aimed to find how risk and risk reducing measures are identified and addressed in risk 
analysis. To be able to find out how this is done, case studies have been selected to find how risk and 
risk reducing measures are presented. The study also includes a literature review of relevant topics 
that are concerned with the content of the risk analysis. In addition, informal interviews have been 
conducted with the most important stakeholders to get an overview of how the risk analysis process 
is prepared and processed.  
 
Literature Review 
  
The first step of starting this thesis was to go through literature that was considered relevant, with 
emphasis on gaining fundamental understanding of key elements. Through, undertaking a literature 
review, the definitions and terms that are most relevant have been distinguished, analyzed and 
presented. Regulations in Norway and standards that are considered relevant have been analyzed 
and presented to get a better understanding. Furthermore, a course related to regulatory 
competence for the petroleum industry was attended to get the underlying understanding of 
Norwegian regulations and relevant standards (RVK, 2012). Through this course the regulations were 
presented and the most important and relevant regulations for this thesis have been selected and 
presented in Section 2.   
 
A literature review was also performed to identify potential improvements that can be implemented 
in risk analyses used in the oil industry in Norway. Most of the literature used, has been selected 
from the literature used throughout the Masters study that are related to risk. A lot of time has been 
used on determining the correct literature that should be used for this thesis.  
 
These selected literatures illustrate the most important definitions and terms that will contribute in 
analyzing the research questions. When having the needed knowledge to understand the terms risk 
and risk reduction measures, the risk analyses for the case studies can be evaluated. The case studies 
are very comprehensive and require understanding of risk to be able to analyse the risk analyses.    
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Interviews 
 
Non-formal interviews and discussions have been performed regarding the content of the risk 
analyses, with personnel at Aker Solutions. Relevant personnel that are using the risk analyses on a 
daily basis have been addressed to find out what their perception has been regarding the risk 
analyses. These conversations and discussions were not formal and thus not used in a large scale 
throughout the thesis, as this was preferred by the informants. The main focus was to get input on 
how the risk analysis is addressed and used on a daily basis for the people that use them. They 
wished to remain anonymous, but gave their perceptions and opinions related to how risk and risk 
reducing measures are identified and addressed in risk analyses.  
 
In addition, the consulting companies that have prepared the risk analyses of the three case studies 
have been contacted. Conversations and discussions have been performed to understand the 
underlying understanding of the process for identifying and addressing risk and risk reducing 
measures. These informants also wished to remain anonymous. Therefore, their information has 
been used to the minimum in this thesis. The main purpose of having discussions with key informants 
that prepare the risk analysis is to find out how the risk analysis process is prepared and further 
evaluated as well as seeking information on the aspects that the risk analysis is missing or lacking. 
Through these conversations, the process of preparing and determining a risk analysis was explained. 
When understanding how the risk analysis is processed, the underlying understanding was 
established. These companies determine the risk reduction measures together with the operating 
companies; the informants that were contacted explained how they address risk and risk reduction 
measures and how they are determined. Since they wanted to remain anonymous, the information 
that was given, contributed to a better understanding of their processes for determining risk and risk 
reduction measures. 
   
To get an understanding of how and what the operator company contributed with, in the risk 
analysis, non formal interviews have been conducted with Informants from the operator company. 
These Informants were both involved in the risk analysis process of the three case studies used, and 
with other similar case studies.   
 
Also, non formal interviews have been conducted with the PSA; they also wished to remain 
anonymous. The interviews were open interviews, where questions were prepared but the 
interviews were more focus on discussions and conversations, rather than a formal interview. The 
interviews with the authorities contribute to the thesis, with an other view and conception than the 
ones from the consulting or operating companies.  
 
Notes were taken from the conversations to further implement in this thesis. A qualitative approach 
has been used in this thesis to present and give an understanding of risk and risk reduction measures 
in risk analyses. The link between research questions, collected data (case studies) and research 
conclusions is the research design used in this thesis (Blaikie, 2009).  
 
By conducting open and non formal interviews (or rather discussions and conversations) the 
Informants have been able to share more information. They felt comfortable to talk about subjects 
that they wouldn’t have been comfortable talking about if it was a more formal interview, or if they 
were quoted and referred to. Therefore, the non informal interviews were a conscious decision to let 
the Informants speak their minds and have as much information as possible to use in this thesis.     
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Case studies 
 
The most important part of the thesis is the evaluation and analysis of the risk analyses from the 
three case studies. The case studies that are selected, in agreement with the supervisors, represent 
risk analyses that are used in the oil industry to determine the risk that is involved. Three cases have 
been selected to increase the potential for generalisation and to compare them with each other; 
they contribute as evidence (Yin, 2009). A better understating is then established regarding the risk 
analyses that are used in the oil industry by these documentations. The three case studies have 
different approaches and thus differ in content. By evaluating the literature review and the three 
cases, the research question and purpose was then determined. The following documents were 
included in the risk analysis for the three cases (the documents where further divided into 
subdocuments and appendices): 
 
Case study: Documents: 
Quantitative risk analysis- Gudrun tie-in Concept Risk Analysis of Gudrun tie-in 
 HAZID analysis 
 Sensitivity Analysis 
 Preliminary Design Accidental Loads Specifications 
 Accidental Loads 
 Risk Assessment 
 Emergency Preparedness Analysis 
Total Risk Analysis- Sleipner Summary Report 
 Emergency Preparedness Analysis 
 Risk Analysis report Sleipner A 
 Risk Analysis report Sleipner B 
 Risk Analysis report Sleipner R 
 Risk Analysis report Sleipner T 
Concept Risk Analysis- Troll A Pre-
compression 
Concept Risk Analysis of Troll A Pre-compression 
 HAZID analysis 
 Explosion Risk and Fire analysis 
 Sensitivity analysis 
 Emergency Preparedness Analysis 
 Installation Risk Analysis 
 Ventilation and Wind analysis 
Table 1: Risk Analysis documents  
 
Through analyzing and comparing the case studies, further discussions can be performed and a 
conclusion is given regarding how the risk and risk reducing measures are identified and addressed. 
Potential improvements for the risk analyses have been proposed through learning and evaluating 
the case studies. The theoretical basis establishes the main understanding required to describe and 
evaluate the risk analyses in the case studies. 
 
All views and opinions throughout this thesis are the responsibility of the author only and do not 
represent the involved organisations or people interviewed. 
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Structure of the thesis 
  
The most effective and productive structure for introducing and analyzing this thesis has been 
evaluated. And the structure that is used in the thesis is used to let the user understand the focus for 
the research. The structure of the research is divided into the following sections: 
 
Section 1: Theoretical approach 
The first section of the thesis is regarding the theoretical background that is necessary to have before 
analyzing and further evaluating the purpose of this thesis. This section is further divided into two 
different subsections. The first subsection is regarding the regulations (in Norway) and standards 
(both Norwegian and international) related to risk in the offshore industry. The most important 
regulations and standards have been presented. The second subsection is a literature review, which 
is essential to interpret and perceive the other sections in the thesis. Through the theoretical 
background the most important terms and definitions have been demonstrated.  
 
Section 2: Case study 
The case studies have been analyzed to determine the risk identification process and how risk is 
addressed. Three case studies have been presented and analyzed in this section. The three case 
studies are introduced with the main focus being on risk and risk reducing measures, examples from 
the fire- and explosion analysis have been used to illustrate how risk is being introduced and used in 
the three risk analyses.  
 
Section 3: Discussion 
The third section goes through the three case studies that have been presented and discusses them. 
The relationship and differences between the three cases are analysed and discussed against each 
other, based on the risk presentation of the risk analyses, to determine improvement potentials. This 
has been done with focus on the theoretical background and regulations and standards.  
 
Section 4: Conclusion 
A conclusion is given to complete and understand how risk and risk reducing measures are identified 
and handled in quantitative-, concept- and total risk analysis. 
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Section 1: Theoretical approach  
 
The first section of this thesis presents the theoretical background that provides the most relevant 
terms and definitions for this thesis. The theoretical approach has been divided into two subsections 
to distinguish between two major views that are critical in this thesis.  
 
The first subsection is regarding the regulations, recommendations and standards that are used in 
the Norwegian petroleum industry. The regulations shall be followed and the standards are 
recommendations that are given to be able to follow the regulations. The most relevant regulations 
that are related to risk and risk reducing measures have been presented. In addition, the standards 
that are recommended by the authorities and the standards that are used in the three risk analyses 
have been introduced and explained. The main reason for selecting the presented standards is that 
these standards represent how risk and risk reducing measures should be used. 
 
The second subsection presents the literature review that is selected in order to understand and 
analyze the risk identification process and evaluate how the risk reducing measures are identified 
and addressed in the case studies. The most important and relevant terms and definitions have been 
selected and demonstrated. These particular terms and definitions have been selected in order to 
understand and interpret the risk analysis for the case studies that are used in this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
”Research without theory is blind, and theory without research is empty”  
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) 
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1.1 Regulations and Standards 
 
Working in the petroleum industry means working in a high risk environment. The high risk involved 
can for instance be due to hazards regarding oil/gas pressure and temperature for the produced 
fluids.  Therefore, Health, Safety and the Environment (HSE) are factors that need to be taken into 
consideration in analysis and preparations to avoid unwanted situations. The laws, thus the 
regulations in the petroleum industry context, have been presented to protect and secure the people 
involved and safeguard the material assets for the community. Therefore, regulations and standards 
have been established to ensure a safe working environment. All regulations must be read and 
understood as consistent regulations and in the context of the governing laws. In addition, the 
authorities recommend the use of norms that are outlined in the guidelines; this also includes the 
use of standards. These recommended standards ensure that the intensions of the regulatory 
requirements are being followed (RVK, 2012). The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) is 
responsible for ensuring and controlling submission and obedience with the regulations.  
 
The regulatory- and standardization levels in the regulations can be placed in the Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: Regulations and standards (RVK, 2012) 
 
 
The Framework regulations (2001) are used to determine goals that are the superior quantities that 
the oil companies have set for themselves in correspondence with the regulations. Risk and risk 
reducing measures have to be identified and determined to keep the risk as low as reasonably 
practicable. These risk reducing measures and the identification of risk needs theoretical concepts to 
prepare a risk analysis of for instance a platform or a modification of a platform.  
    
Risk reducing measures in the context of risk management in quantitative risk analysis for maintenance 
and modification projects 
 
Page 20 of 78 
 
The coherence between the regulations, theoretical concepts, risk (reducing measures) and the 
superior goals can be illustrated through Figure 2: 
 
 
Figure 2: Coherence with regulations (Aven et al., 2004) 
 
Management of risk and safety regarding the offshore industry has two main elements; superior 
goals and risk reducing measures (Aven et al., 2004). The superior goals are concerned with the 
visions and goals that need to be determined depending on the surroundings, available elements, 
economy, experience, etc. Most of the oil companies strive to achieve the ultimate goal zero, where 
no harm is done to the people or the environment before- during- and after production. To be able 
to achieve the determined visions and goals, measures need to be determined and implemented.  
 
The measures in the context of this thesis are the risk reducing measures that need to be identified 
and determined to reduce the risk as low as reasonably practicable. In addition to superior goals and 
risk reducing measures, theoretical concepts and frame conditions need to be taken under 
consideration. Through theoretical concepts, the understanding regarding superior goals and risk 
reducing measures can be established. A theoretical concept is needed to understand the risk 
concept and establish the underlying understanding before starting the risk analysis process. When 
the underlying understanding is established, the risk acceptance criteria and the risk reducing 
measures can be determined and further analyzed. The framework is dependent on the resources 
available, the situation and risk management approach. In the oil industry, the regulations set by the 
PSA are important frameworks that shall be followed (Aven et al., 2004).    
 
Superior goals 
Frame work 
Theoretical concepts 
Risk (reducing 
measures) 
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1.1.1 Norwegian Regulations 
 
In Norway the regulations are set by the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA), these regulations related 
to health, safety and the environment in the petroleum activities and at onshore facilities are divided 
into the following sections: 
 
 The Framework Regulations 
 The Management Regulations 
 Technical and Operational Regulations 
 The Facilities Regulations 
 The Activities Regulations 
 
The Framework Regulations (2001) contribute to a basis of the coordinated regulations and 
supervision offshore and some specific onshore facilities, regarding health, safety and environment. 
They demonstrate the fundamental requirements for how to manage activities in the oil industry 
(RVK, 2012).  
 
Framework Regulations (2001) § 11, is the section regarding the risk reducing principles. It states that 
the “harm or danger of harm to people, the environment or material assets shall be prevented or 
limited in accordance with the health, safety and environment legislation, including internal 
requirements and acceptance criteria that are of significance for complying with requirements in this 
legislation. In addition, the risk shall be further reduced to the extent possible.”   
 
Risk shall be reduced, also in the early stages when choosing the technical, operational and 
organisational solutions. The potential harm to individuals has to be analysed and reduced to offer 
the best possible results provided that the costs are not unbalanced with regards to the risk 
reduction that will be achieved. Risk reducing measures have to be presented to reduce the risk as 
much as possible. The measures and solutions that will reduce the uncertainty towards the health 
and safety of the personnel shall be chosen. In addition, the elements that contribute to harm to 
people, assets or the environment shall be replaced with elements that will have less potential of 
harm.  
 
The health, safety and security of the people involved on a platform are the most crucial aspects that 
need to be taken into consideration. Framework Regulations (2001) §11 illustrates that, when 
identifying risk and risk reducing measures in the context of quantitative risk analysis, the health, 
safety and security of the personnel has to be the highest priority. The Guidelines of § 11 from the 
Framework Regulations (2001) further address general risk reducing principles, for instance: 
 
 ALARP principle (As Low As Reasonably Practicable): the risk shall be further reduced beyond 
the minimum level that follows from the regulations.  
 BAT principle (Best Available Technology): the party responsible shall use a basis for its 
planning and operations the technology and methods that the best and most effective 
results 
 Pre cautionary principle: clarify a principle that is recognized (inter)nationally in the area of 
HSE   
 Substitution principle: alternative solutions shall be chosen that do not entail the relevant 
risk factor 
 
These Guidelines can be implemented in the risk analysis to indicate the use of the risk reducing 
principles.  
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Regulations related to management and the duty to provide information in the petroleum activities 
and at certain onshore facilities (2010) state that risk reducing from § 11 shall be selected by the 
responsible parties. Management Regulation (2010) § 9 demonstrates the acceptance criteria for 
major accidents and environmental risk. The acceptance criteria shall be set for the people that are 
involved both offshore and onshore. In particularly, acceptance criteria shall be set for the people 
that are exposed to a particular and/or higher risk depending on the area they work at. Acceptance 
criteria shall also be determined for loss of main safety functions and damage to the environment or 
third party. By setting these acceptance criteria the risk identification process has to be determined 
in advance, before the risk analysis process. Furthermore, they are important with regards to the risk 
acceptance criteria that are determined before specifying the risk reducing measures. A risk analysis 
should contain risk acceptance criteria to illustrate the criteria that are distinguished with respect to 
the risk involved. When the criteria have been distinguished, the risk reducing measures can be 
specified.   
 
The risk analysis shall have a clear purpose, also the conditions, structure, building and the 
limitations that form the basis of the risk analysis.  The risk analysis shall be presented in a balanced 
and comprehensive matter for the target group. This indicates that the “responsible party shall carry 
out risk analyses that provide a balanced and most comprehensive possible picture of the risk 
associated with the activities. The analyses shall be appropriate as regards providing support for 
decisions related to the upcoming operation or phase”. 
 
Facilities Regulations (2010) § 7, which is related to the Main Safety Functions, states that the main 
safety functions shall be defined for each facility to ensure that the safety of the personnel is 
guaranteed. The main safety functions shall be maintained to prevent escalation of accident 
situations and protect the rooms and areas that are most exposed.  
 
The risk acceptance criteria have to be determined for the main safety functions in addition to 
acceptance criteria for personnel or the environment. Accidents and hazards may occur even if the 
regulations and recommended actions are undertaken; therefore emergency preparedness analysis 
shall be carried out. The emergency preparedness analysis is a part of the risk analysis where major 
risk factors are evaluated.  Risk analysis shall be accomplished to identify and determine the 
contributions to major accidents and the uncertainty involved. Necessary assessments shall be 
carried out for sensitivity and uncertainty analysis. Thus, the risk analysis shall (Management 
Regulations, 2010, § 17): 
 
a)    identify hazard and accident situations, 
b)    identify initiating incidents and ascertain the causes of such incidents, 
c)    analyse accident sequences and potential consequences, and 
d)    identify and analyse risk-reducing measures 
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1.1.2 Norwegian Technology Standards 
 
The Norwegian petroleum industry has developed the NORSOK (NOrsk SOkkels Konkurranseposisjon) 
standards to ensure adequate safety, value adding and cost effectiveness for existing and future 
petroleum industry developments. NORSOK standards have been published by the Norwegian 
Technology Standards Institution (NTS) which covers both technical and operational matters 
regarding safety in the petroleum industry (NORSOK Z013, 2010). Most of the NORSOK standards 
have been recommended to follow by the PSA. Therefore, understanding and exercising these 
standards can be an advantage to use when following the regulations. The risk analysis used in this 
thesis shall follow the regulations, but should also include the standards that are recommended. 
 
NORSOK Z-013 
 
NORSOK Z-013 (2010) has been developed to establish requirements for effective planning, 
execution and use of risk and emergency preparedness analysis as well as the use of risk acceptance 
criteria. This standard has been recommended to be used by the PSA when determining risk- and 
emergency preparedness analysis. NORSOK Z013 (2010) has also been used for the risk analyses of 
the case studies used in this thesis. NORSOK Z-013 (2010) is based on the following elements: 
 
- Establishment of risk acceptance criteria prior to execution of risk analysis 
- The relation between risk and EPA, especially the integration of the two types of analysis 
into one overall analysis process 
- Planning and execution of analyses 
- Further requirements to use of risk and EPA for different activities and life cycle phases 
- Establishment of requirements based on risk and EPA 
 
Thus, this standard has been used and referred to throughout the risk analysis for the case studies. 
The main purpose for the standards is to illustrate the recommended actions that need to be 
analyzed in a risk analysis.  
 
This standard overlaps and meets the regulations set by the PSA, due to the fact that risk and 
emergency preparedness plans are in focus. When determining the risk analysis, these factors should 
be presented. 
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1.1.3 International Standards 
 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is a worldwide federation of national 
standards bodies. The preparations of these standards are carried out through the ISO technical 
committees. International organizations, governmental and non- governmental, in cooperation with 
ISO, work on these standards (ISO 13702, 1999). As for the NORSOK standards, the ISO standards are 
recommended to follow in the risk analysis process. ISO standards have been used in the risk 
analyses of the three cases. The two ISO standards that have been presented below have been used 
for the risk control and mitigation of fires and explosions. In addition, the guidelines and tools 
presented in the last ISO standard have been used to identify hazards or identify risks. 
 
International Standard 13702 
 
ISO 1372 (1999), Petroleum and natural gas industries – Control and mitigation of fires and 
explosions on offshore production installations- Requirements and guidelines, has been developed to 
assist in the development of new and existing installations; the standard should only be used where 
it is reasonably practical to do so. This International Standard describes the objectives, requirements 
and guidelines for the control and mitigation of fires and explosions on offshore installations. The 
principal objectives are the safety of the personnel, the protection of the environment and assets and 
the minimization of financial consequences of fires and explosions. Controlling and mitigating fires 
and explosions are important factors that should be presented and evaluated in a risk analysis. The 
risk that is involved should then be identified and presented as well as the risk reducing measures. 
The safety of the personnel is the most important objective that this ISO standard represents, as in 
the regulations set by the PSA, and this should also be the case for the risk analysis.  
 
International Standard 17776 
 
ISO 17776 (2002) is from the British Standard Petroleum and natural gas industries, offshore 
production installations, and is used as Guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard identification 
and risk assessment. This international standard has been developed to assist with managing hazard 
identification and analysing risk. Oil and gas exploration and production activities can involve hazards 
that need to be identified as well as the consequences of the hazards. This standard complements 
the regulations by describing several tools and techniques that can be used to identify and manage 
hazards and risks. Hazard identification and risk analysis can be managed by identifying the hazards, 
assessing the risks involved and reducing or eliminating risk. Identifying potential hazards should be 
part of a risk analysis to determine the risk involved in the potential hazards. The risk and the risk 
reducing measures have to be presented to assess the risk. The risk reducing measures will then 
contribute to reducing or even eliminating the risk that is involved for the potential hazards that are 
identified.  
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1.2 Literature review  
 
Through understanding definitions and terms, the analysis of case studies can be carried out. A 
theoretical background will illustrate the most important definitions in order to understand the case 
studies that are presented and then the discussion that is given. By having the right theoretical 
background the understanding of this thesis will also become easier. The terms and definitions that 
are explained in this section are the ones that are considered most relevant and important for 
understanding the concept behind the case studies and their risk analysis.  
 
To analyse the risk that is involved in for instance a case study, different risk analysis methods can be 
used. In this case quantitative-, concept- and total risk analysis have been used in the different case 
studies to analyze the risk that is involved when a tie-in to a platform is considered or when a pre-
compressor is to be installed. To be able to determine the risk that is involved in the different case 
studies, risk acceptance criteria are set to determine the acceptable risk, therefore risk acceptance 
criteria are important to determine. When the risk has been identified through a hazards and risk 
identification process, the risk reducing measures can be determined to distinguish the measures 
that can be implemented to reduce the risk as low as reasonably practicable.  
 
The most important definitions have been further described in the subsections of Section 1.2, 
containing: 
- 1.2.1 Risk 
- 1.2.2 Risk Analysis 
- 1.2.3 Risk Acceptance Criteria 
- 1.2.4 Risk Reducing Measures 
- 1.2.5 The ALARP principle 
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1.2.1 Risk 
 
In the oil industry risk is presented in different ways for systems, both offshore and onshore. 
Standards and regulations are given to reduce risk and minimize the possibility of an occurrence that 
was not intended. They are for instance available in the NORSOK standards where operational and 
technical safety issues are handled. The operator and service companies shall have an effective 
process of evaluating and managing elements as health, safety, environment and risk (ISO 13702, 
1999).  
 
Risk, as a definition, refers to uncertainty about and severity of the consequences of an activity with 
respect to something that human’s value (Aven, Renn, 2010). The term risk can be seen as the 
“absence of safety” and is used as a goal for setting the safety levels (TRA Sleipner, 2004). Safety can 
be defined as the absence of unwanted and destructive events. High risk is being perceived as an 
unknown event and vice versa. Risk is thus a product of the consequences of the unwanted events 
towards personnel, assets and the environment, as well as the probability that these events may 
occur.  
 
NORSOK standard Z-013 (2010) defines risk as the combination of the probability of occurrence of 
harm and the severity of that harm. Risk may be expressed qualitatively as well as quantitatively 
where the probability of occurrence is set between 0 and 1 or as a frequency, with the inverse of 
time as dimension. Whereas, ISO standard 13702 (1999) explains risk as the combination of the 
chance that a specified undesired event occurs and that the severity of the consequences of that 
event are taken into consideration.  
 
Regulations set by the PSA Norway (Framework Regulations, 2001) also define risk, in the area of 
health, safety and working environment, as a combination of probability and consequence. Risk shall 
be reduced as much as possible. The solutions for reducing risk and the barriers that have the highest 
risk reducing purpose shall be chosen.   
 
To be able to set and prepare a risk analysis process, the risk picture develops the scope of the 
analysis. It shall include a clear description of the objective and scope of the analysis as well as of the 
methodology that is set to be used in the analysis (NORSOK Z013, 2010 ). The presentation of the risk 
picture should include the ranking of risk contributors, potential risk reducing measures, 
assumptions, premises etc. Moreover, risk can be expressed in different ways, but the most general 
way of expressing risk is (Aven et al., 2004): 
 
“the uncertainty regarding what the outcome/ consequences are of a given activity”  
 
Since risk can be defined in different ways, it is necessary to understand and create an understanding 
of risk related to a certain activity. In addition, the risk definition should be expressed in a risk 
analysis to ensure that the reader of the risk analysis understands the meaning of risk that is further 
used. 
 
Risk involved in a particular situation can be calculated and the consequences can be determined for 
the people that might be involved.  Thus, when risk is related to the loss of lives that are involved, 
the Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) value can be implemented to determine the risk picture. The FAR value 
expresses the number of fatalities per 100 million exposed hours for a defined group of personnel or 
activities, which often is used as a risk criterion (NORSOK Z013, 2010). FAR values should be used 
since operating companies have a demand for maximum annual frequencies related to personnel 
risk. These frequencies are the alleged main safety functions (Aven, Vinnem, 2007).   
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The Table below gives an indication of FAR values that have been observed for other activities as well 
as the oil industry (TRA Sleipner, 2004): 
 
Professions/ Activities FAR value 
Helicopter flying 740 
Diving 320 
Flying 56 
Car passenger 29 
Motorcycle  28 
Oil industry 19 
Travelling by train 5 
Table 2: Observed FAR values (TRA Sleipner, 2004) 
 
The Potential Loss of Life (PLL) is used to identify the potential risk level for the personnel in a specific 
area or for a field. The PLL value, for a specified area, expresses how many persons are expected to 
die in a year as a consequence of an accident in the area (TRA Sleipner, 2004). However, the PLL 
value is dependent on how often the accident occurs and how many lives are exposed or lost. PLL 
should be used as a criterion for installations that are unmanned or for groups that normally are not 
exposed to risk. The loss of lives in for instance the installation or modification phases can be taken 
into consideration when determining the risk reducing measures. Therefore, the PLL and the FAR 
values are an essential part of the risk analysis process and are used in the case studies that have 
been selected for this thesis.  The relation between FAR and PLL used in the case studies is expressed 
as (TRA Sleipner, 2004): 
 
TN
PLL
FAR



810
 
 
Where: 
N= Number of personnel working in that area 
T= Average number of working hours a years 
108= Number of hours exposed 
 
Risk can be graphically illustrated with the help of a risk matrix. The arrangement of accident 
probability and corresponding consequence in a matrix may be a suitable expression of risk in cases 
where many accidental events are involved or where single value calculation is difficult (NORSOK 
Z013, 2010). The matrix is separated into three regions, which can be expressed both quantitatively 
and qualitatively: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Risk Matrix (NORSOK Z013, 2010) 
 Unacceptable risk 
 ALARP area 
 Acceptable risk 
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The area that is set as the “ALARP” region is between acceptable and unacceptable risk, where 
evaluations have to be carried out in order to determine whether further risk reduction is required or 
whether more detailed studies should be conducted. This area can be seen as “risk reducing needed 
area” or the ALARP area, since the risk should be as low as reasonably practicable. Including a risk 
matrix is important to enable ranking of risk and the consequence and frequency involved. It also 
reflects where risk reducing measures are needed; also after the risk reducing measures are 
implemented, further risk can be determined again with help of the risk matrix (NORSOK Z013, 2010).  
 
1.2.2 Risk Analysis 
 
Through risk analysis the nature and the quantity of risk related to an activity is expressed. Usually a 
risk analysis is a methodology that uses analytical methods in a systematic approach to determine 
risk. This approach can be improved over time through learning from previous activities or analyses 
(NORSOK Z013, 2010). The most important aspect of the risk analysis is the identification of 
consistent hazards. Through the identification process of hazards and the scope of the hazards, the 
risk involved can be determined. When the risk involved has been identified and determined, the 
cause and consequence analysis can start. The causes of the hazards are then being evaluated as well 
as the consequences of the hazards occurring. Throughout the entire risk analysis process, the risk 
description plays a crucial part. When the risk has been identified, the risk acceptance criteria can be 
set and the risk reducing measures can be determined. The risk assessments process can be 
illustrated by for instance using an event tree, as has been done in the case studies used for this 
thesis. Thus, a risk analysis specifies the main elements and risk involved in a certain situation or 
event and determines the uncertainties when evaluating probabilities for (un) desired outcomes. 
Consequently, the risk picture is produced (Pham, 2011).   
 
The term Quantitative Risk Assessment/Analysis (QRA) refers to assessing the frequency of an event 
and its measurable consequences like fatalities, damages, etc. When identifying a hazard, frequency 
(probability) and consequence of the event, are used in risk analysis (Smith, 2011). A QRA systemises 
the present state of knowledge including the uncertainties about the phenomena, processes, 
activities and systems involved are being analysed. It identifies the possible hazards and threats as 
well as their causes and consequences to determine whether the risk is tolerable or acceptable, 
choosing the most effective and efficient risk policy. This can be the risk reducing measures. Aven 
(2011) discusses that to model systemic accidents it is necessary to go beyond causal chains and 
describe systems performance as a whole, where the steps and stages on the way to an accident are 
seen as parts of the whole.  
 
Even though QRA are often used in the oil industry for determining the risk and hazards involved in a 
given situation, QRA has also receiver strong criticism due to the fact that uncertainties often are 
underestimated. In addition, using QRA when there isn’t enough knowledge regarding probabilities 
and consequences the QRA can be misleading (Pham, 2011). As Aven (2011) discusses, the QRA 
should not be eliminated when knowledge is lacking, but rather improved.   
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NORSOK Z013 states that a QRA should include several elements (NORSOK Z013, 2010): 
 
Requirements regarding the content of the risk analysis: 
1) identify hazardous situations and potential accidental events; 
2) identify initiating events and describe their potential causes; 
3) analyse accidental sequences and their potential consequences; 
4) identify and asses risk reducing measures; 
5)provide a overall picture of risk, presented in a way suitable for the various target groups;  
Table 3: Content of the risk analysis (NORSOK Z013, 2010)  
 
NORSOK Z013 states that the QRA should include process accidents, storage accidents, blowouts, etc. 
in the process of analysing the initial events when identifying potential hazards (NORSOK Z013, 
2010). The standard sets requirement that analysis of the following shall, as a minimum, be included 
if the hazard is relevant according to the objective: 
 
Requirements regarding quantitative analysis: 
1) process accidents; 
2) risers/landfall and pipeline accidents; 
3) storage accidents (liquid and gas); 
4) loading/offloading accidents; 
5) blowouts and well releases;  
6) accidents in utility systems, e.g. leaks of chemicals, fires, explosion of transformers etc.; 
7) accidents caused by external impact and environmental loads, e.g. collision, falling/ swinging 
loads, helicopter crash, earthquake, waves; 
8) structural failure (including gross errors); 
9) loss of stability and/or buoyancy (including failure of marine systems). 
Table 4: Requirements regarding quantitative analysis (NORSOK Z013, 2010) 
 
The Concept Risk Analysis (CRA) addresses a certain concept in a risk analysis; this can for instance be 
a in modification phase or a replacement phase on a platform. The CRA should include the 
identification of the hazards, their causes and their consequences, in order to demonstrate and 
determine the risks involved in a concept phase. The main purpose of a CRA is the comparisons of 
alternatives and an assessment of compliance of the overall risk acceptance criteria that often are 
determined in the TRA. Moreover, the risk reducing measures should be evaluated and determined 
to get the risk as low as reasonably practicable. The CRA is often undertaken when the decision has 
been made to proceed in installing for instance a new pre-compressor on a platform (NORSOK Z013, 
1998).  
 
The Total Risk Analysis (TRA) often illustrates the entire frame or all the design change analysis, 
regarding for instance a platform, often in the project phase. The main purpose of the TRA is the 
verification of for instance a design, for determining compliance with the pre-determined risk 
acceptance criteria. It provides the overall assumptions for a safe operation. The TRA should also 
include the identification of the hazards, their causes and their consequences, in order to 
demonstrate and determine the risks involved in a concept phase.  Throughout the lifecycle of for 
instance a platform, TRA updates need to be undertaken to update when modifications have been 
made, new installations have been made, experience etc (NORSOK Z013, 1998). These updates in the 
TRA can be demonstrated in for instance quantitative risk analysis or concept risk analysis. 
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Thus, the risk analysis and the risk analysis process can be summarized as an accumulation of 
numerous activities and evaluations that have been performed with regards to risk, to implement 
and maintain any support that is needed in a decision making stage.  
 
A risk analysis can consist of several different sections; including hazard identifications, explosions 
and fire analysis, ALARP evaluations and emergency preparedness analysis. The hazards 
identification, sensitivity analysis and emergency preparedness analysis were addressed as the most 
crucial parts of the risk analysis process for the case studies used in this thesis, to analyze how risk 
and risk reducing measures are identified and addressed. 
 
 Hazard identification 
 
Defining hazards is crucial, especially on an oil platform, but the methodology and analysis is the 
most important part. The term hazard can be defined as the potential harm resulting in injuries to 
humans, damaging the environment or property, or a combination of these factors (ISO 17776, 
2002).  It is the source of physical damage that can convert into damage to people and the 
environment. Risk identifies the uncertainty and possibility of this damage as well consequences. 
Hazard Identification (HAZID) and risk assessment is crucial with respect to the risk identification that 
is needed to identify the risks involved. HAZID, as a technique is used to identify the considerable 
hazards correlated with the activity under consideration. HAZID and risk assessment has therefore 
been divided into identifying the hazards, assessing the risk involved and identifying the elimination 
or reducing of the risk involved (ISO 17776, 2002). 
 
After the hazard analysis, the cause should be evaluated to find the probability and risk involved of 
the hazard occurring. In order to identify the hazards and risk involved, the following approaches can 
be used (ISO 17776, 2002):  
 
- Experience 
- Checklists 
- Standards 
- Structured review techniques 
 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Another crucial part of a risk analysis is the sensitivity analysis. The sensitivities analysis evaluates 
how the calculated risk changes, due to the changes in the information that the analysis is based on 
(Aven, 2008). The sensitivity analysis illustrates the effect and risk of changes made on for instance a 
platform. In addition, the sensitivity analysis should include the evaluations of effect that 
changes/modifications have on the risk reducing measures. This can be related to changes that 
influence the risk related to manning on a platform, leak frequencies, environmental vulnerability, 
and potential accidents etc. This indicates that the analysis results are depending on different types 
of conditions and evaluations. In a modification project several sensitive elements may be evaluated. 
The sensitivity analysis should include the identification of the most important aspects and 
assumptions, in addition to the evaluation of their effects and the effects of the potential risk 
reducing measures (NORSOK Z013, 2010). Through, among others, the sensitivity analysis the risk 
involved and the risk picture can be established. The sensitivity analysis is set as a requirement in 
NORSOK Z13 (2010) for establishing a part of the risk picture.  
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Emergency Preparedness Analysis 
 
The Emergency Preparedness Analysis (EPA) is an analysis which includes establishment of the 
defined situations of hazards and accidents, including major dimensioning accidental events, 
establishment of performance standards for emergency preparedness and their fulfilment and 
identification of emergency preparedness measures (NORSOK Z013, 2010). EPA identifies the danger- 
and accident situations that are essential to establish an emergency preparedness plan for. NORSOK 
Z013 (2010) states risk and emergency preparedness can be used as a basis for decision making, in 
different types of activities and different life cycle phases. The emergency preparedness is often 
based on the visions, goals and principles of the operator company. The EPA is also based on the risks 
and the risk acceptance criteria in a certain activity. Through an EPA the hazards are identified and an 
analysis is performed related to the potential initiating events and their consequences, to establish a 
risk picture and thus an important part of a risk analysis. The EPA should for instance include escape 
routes, safe areas, consequences for manning or pollution etc. (NORSOK Z013, 2010). 
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1.2.3 Risk Acceptance Criteria 
 
To set the limits and criteria for which risk level that can be accepted, Risk Acceptance Criteria (RAC) 
is established. The criteria for the accepted risk level should be determined before the risk analysis 
process starts. The acceptable criteria are set through quantitative and qualitative measuring criteria 
for the company (NORSOK Z013, 2010). The importance of RAC can be stressed due to the fact that 
before the risk analysis can begin, the accepted criteria should be determined. Through this criteria, 
that is set to be the accepted risk that can be involved in a given situation, the risk definition can be 
explained in for instance a case study. The main purpose of RAC is to keep the risk related to certain 
activities at a level that is considered acceptable and should be as low as possible (Aven et al., 2004).  
 
By determining  the RAC before starting any risk analysis process, an average risk determination is 
made so that the acceptable criteria for the personnel and for the most exposed group complement 
each other (Managing Regulations, 2010).  The determined goals that are further set should then not 
exceed these accepted criteria. Barriers shall be set to reduce the probability of failures and hazard 
and accident situations developing, as well as limiting possible harm and disadvantages, to manage 
health, safety and the environment. These solutions and barriers, which have the greatest risk 
reducing effects, shall be chosen based on evaluations (Management Regulations, 2010). The RAC 
are used to provide support in the decision making processes. They should be formulated based on 
the damage potential and activity level represented by a certain activity. 
 
RAC sets the total risk level which is defined as tolerable, with respect to a specified period of time or 
phase of the activity. The RAC represents a reference for the estimation of the need of risk reducing 
measures; therefore the RAC should be available foregoing the start of the risk analysis (Aven, 
Vinnem and Vollen, 2006). Most of the accepted criteria regarding risk involved are set determined 
by the operator company that is involved. The RAC should reflect the safety purposes and the 
particularities of the process that is evaluated (NORSOK Z013, 2010). When the RAC have been 
determined, the risk analysis process can start and the risk reducing measures can be established for 
risk that is involved in each particular case.   
 
NORSOK Z013 (2010) states that the RAC should include the regulations that control safety and the 
environmental aspects of the activities, as well as the ALARP principle (see Section 1.2.4). In addition, 
the RAC should recognize norms for the activity that is given and a criterion regarding the risk level of 
similar industries.  The main safety functions should also be defined for each facility involved. Further 
documentation of the RAC used is necessary to be used in the current or future risk analysis 
processes.   
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1.2.4 As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
 
ALARP in general 
 
The ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) principle is a principle that states that risk should be 
reduced as low as reasonably practicable (Aven et al., 2004). The perception is that all reasonable 
measures will be taken in respect to risk that can consist in the so called tolerable area. This is done 
by reducing them moreover until the cost of further risk reducing is roughly excessive to the benefits 
that can be made. In any case, it is necessary to demonstrate the application of good practice (Smith, 
2011). The Guidelines of § 11 from the Framework Regulations (2001) further address general risk 
reducing principles by for instance using the ALARP principle. The ALARP principle is important, when 
determining the RAC and risk reducing measures, to reduce the risk beyond the minimum level that 
follows from the regulations. The risk reducing measures in the three cases used for this thesis are 
referred to as ALARP measures. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the ALARP principle for risk management process:  
 
 
 
Figure 4: The ALARP principle (Smith, 2011) 
 
As the ALARP principle states, a risk reducing measure should be implemented provided it cannot be 
demonstrated that the costs are excessive related to the gains obtained. Thus, when the ALARP 
principle is applied, three regions are taken into consideration:  
 
1. the risk is so low that it is considered negligible 
2. an intermediate level where the ALARP principle applies  
3. the risk is so high that it is intolerable 
 
In most cases, risk is found to be in region 2 and the ALARP principle can then be applied. Therefore a 
committed inquiry to detect any potential risk reducing measures should be applied, as well as an 
evaluation of them to be able to identify the ones that should be implemented (Aven, 2011).   
Risk reducing measures in the context of risk management in quantitative risk analysis for maintenance 
and modification projects 
 
Page 34 of 78 
 
 
In the risk analysis of one of the case studies used for in this thesis, the ALARP measures are 
expressed quantitatively in the following matter (QRA Gudrun tie-in, 2009): 
 
ab
m
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PLL
T

  
 
Where: 
PLLm =  additional PLL under the installation phase 
PLLa =  PLL after the modification 
PLLb=  PLL before the modification 
Tbreak even =  the number of years before the risk reducing measure compensate for the increase 
risk during the installation phase  
 
This formula is used to see if the risk reducing in the operational phase is bigger than the risk 
increase during the installation of the measure.  
 
ALARP in Norway 
 
Framework Regulations (2001) § 11, state that the ALARP principle should be implemented to reduce 
the risk with respect to health, safety and the environment; it states that the risk shall be further 
reduced to the extent possible.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: The ALARP principle in Norway (NORSOK Z013, 2010) 
 
The ALARP area is the entire part under the accepted limit for risk, without any lower region 
(Preventor, 2006). An ALARP demonstration process identifies the potential risk reducing measures, 
evaluates those measures to be able to make decisions and document the accepted and rejected risk 
reducing measures (NORSOK Z013, 2010). 
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1.2.5 Risk reducing measures 
 
Risk reducing measures are set to reduce or mitigate the risk in a certain activity or situation. This can 
include safe solutions and consequence reducing measures as well as emergency preparedness 
measures (HSE, 2006). The risk reducing measures should take into account the reliability and the 
vulnerability of the risk reducing measures and the possibility of documenting and calibrating the 
evaluated measures of risk reduction (NORSOK Z013, 2010). The measures that are set to reduce the 
risk that is involved in each case are an important aspect of the risk analysis process to prevent, 
optimize or mitigate the effect of for instance an accident. Through determining the risk reducing 
measures, the risk involved could be reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (the ALARP 
principle). In the process of setting risk reducing measures, expert judgement and experience can be 
used to determine the measures. It is important to recognize the conditions that can demand change 
from previously used practices, codes and standards. Risk estimation can accommodate in the 
decision making process assuming that the acceptance criteria are determined. Applying safer 
designs and guaranteeing integrity of the assets are measures that should be processed wherever 
attainable. This is also the case for emergency response measures (ISO 13702, 1999). 
 
The general order of determining risk reducing measures is to prevent, detect, control, mitigate and 
emergency response (ISO 17776, 2002). This means that the probability of occurrence should be 
reduced, limit the extent and duration of the hazardous event as well as reducing the consequences 
related to a certain activity. By following this order, or even using these aspects, when determining 
the risk reducing measures, the general requirements for determining the measures will be satisfied. 
Thus, the risk reducing measures that are determined should include the aspects of preventing, 
detecting, controlling and/or mitigating the risk involved, as well as setting up an emergency 
response plan. The technical possibility of setting risk reducing measures will influence the measure 
that will be selected to reduce the risk involved; in addition the costs for implementing the measures 
plays a crucial role. The energy needed to implement the measure with respect to cost, time and 
difficulties involved when implementing, and recourses, etc. should be deliberated against the 
benefits that can be obtained when implementing the measures. However, the risk involved for 
implementing the measures as well as the degree of uncertainties associated with the risk should be 
evaluated (ISO 17776, 2002).   
 
ISO 13702 (1999) states that the risk reducing measures should include:  
 
Risk Reducing Measures: 
a) Measures set to prevent incidents and thus to reduce the probability of them existing 
b) Measures set to control incidents to restricting the magnitude and length of the incident 
c) Measures set to mitigate the impact, thus establishing the measures to reduce the impact of                            
the consequences 
Table 5: Risk Reducing Measures (ISO 13702, 1999) 
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NORSOK Z013 (2010) states that the identification of potential risk reducing measures shall be 
performed throughout and as part of any risk assessment process, in the following way: 
 
Identifying Risk Reducing Measures: 
a) Separate assessments with the purpose of identifying possible risk reducing measures and 
evaluating their effect shall be performed as a part of the risk assessment process; 
b) The assessment shall seek to identify measures with the following priority: 
1) Measures that provide inherently safer design; 
2) Measures that reduce the possibility of accidental events occurring; 
3) Measures that reduce the consequences if accidental events should occur. 
c) Evaluation of possible risk reducing measures should be based on 
1) Qualitative assessments, i.e. reflecting inherent safety principles, best available technology, 
cautionary principles, 
2) Quantitative or qualitative analysis of cost, benefit, and other effects of the relevant 
measures, i.e. reputation, robustness, effectiveness, maintenance and operational effects. 
d) The identification and evaluation of risk reducing measures shall be documented. It shall   include 
a description of the risk reducing process that has been followed, as well as the results of the risk 
reducing process; 
e) Documentation of the risk reducing assessment shall include 
1) Overview of the elements in the risk reducing assessment, 
2) Overview of the involved parties in the assessment, 
3) Documentation of the identified measures and their effect on the risk, supporting analyses 
and evaluations. 
Table 6: Potential Risk Reducing Measures (NORSOK Z013, 2010). 
 
The risk reducing measures should be evaluated and documented to ensure that everyone involved 
has the updated measures and can use it in every stage of the installation; this can involve strategies 
regarding design, fire, explosion, escape routes etc. (ISO 13702, 1999). When evaluating these 
strategies elements need to be taken into consideration related to risk, and for instance the nature of 
the fire and explosion, the environment, the flammable materials and the amount of it, etc. The 
measures should control or decrease uncertain events in the installation layout, the emergency 
shutdown systems, emergency power systems, fire and gas systems by controlling ignition, spills, 
escape routes and setting active/passive fire protection systems. Inspection, testing and 
maintenance are needed to be able to manage the systems (ISO 13702, 1999). 
     
Measures to recover from incidents need be provided based on risk analysis and should be 
developed taking into account possible failures of the control and mitigation measures. The risk 
reducing measures are based on the results of the evaluation, detailed health, safety and 
environmental objectives and functional requirements that should be set at appropriate levels (ISO 
17776, 2002). 
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Section 2: Case studies 
 
This second section of this thesis presents the case studies that are used. Three case studies have 
been selected that are relevant for determining how risk and risk reducing measures are identified 
and addressed. These case studies represent risk analysis that are often used in the Norwegian oil 
industry and thus will give a good indication of how the standard is. The case studies have been 
shortly presented and the most important aspects have been illustrated. Evaluations and analysis 
have been performed for each of the risk analysis related to the three different case studies. 
 
Case 1 presents a quantitative risk analysis of the Gudrun tie-in to the Sleipner platform. The most 
important aspects and elements of the risk analysis have been selected, presented and analyzed. 
Including risk acceptance criteria, risk reducing measures, risk analysis and hazards identification.  
 
Case 2 has been selected due to the fact that it is a total risk analysis of a platform, namely the 
Sleipner platform. The most essential elements of the total risk analysis have been presented and 
analysed in Section 2.2. 
 
The last and third case is a concept risk analysis regarding pre-compressors for Troll. Also here, the 
most important parts of the risk analysis have been presented and analyzed. 
 
The different risk analysis types (quantitative-, total-, and concept-) demonstrate how the risk 
analysis is presented and used. Through analyzing and comparing the three case studies a picture will 
be illustrated regarding the identification of risk and risk reducing measures.  These case studies 
represent current changes that are made or are planned for the near future, thus are relevant for the 
risk analyses that are currently carried out. 
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2.1 Case I: Gudrun tie-in to Sleipner A  
 
The first Case study is related to the Gudrun tie-in to Sleipner. A quantitative risk analysis has been 
performed and this subsection will illustrate the content. The most important aspects of the risk 
analysis, that contribute to identifying risk and risk reducing measures, have been illustrated. 
 
 
2.1.1 System description 
 
The Gudrun field is located approximately 55 km north of Sleipner A (SLA). The water depth is circa 
109 m. The Gudrun field has been developed by a processing platform with water removal and a 
jacket substructure. Oil and gas from Gudrun will supply to Sleipner in two pipelines (QRA Gudrun tie-
in, 2009): 
 
- The rich gas pipeline: the rich gas is routed to an existing inlet separator at Sleipner A. The 
gas from this separator will be routed to Sleipner T for CO2 removal. 
- The oil pipeline is tied in upstream of the third stage separator at Sleipner A. The oil is then 
mixed with the Sleipner oil and the condensate from the Gudrun gas pipeline; into the third 
stage separator and afterwards in the oil export system. 
 
 
Figure 6: Sleipner map (QRA Gudrun tie-in, 2009) 
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2.1.2 Risk Analysis 
 
A Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) has been performed for the tie-in of Gudrun to the Sleipner A 
platform. The QRA of the modifications on Sleipner related to the tie-in are performed to identify any 
risk aspects that might influence the risk perception on Sleipner A and Sleipner T (SLT), performed in 
2009. A lot of the information used for the tie-in is related to the TRA for Sleipner, which is Case 
Study II (Section 2.2). 
 
Risk has been presented through the following technical analyses that have been performed as part 
of the risk analysis (QRA Gudrun tie-in, 2009):  
- HAZID analysis 
- Sensitivity Analysis 
- Preliminary Design Accidental Loads Specifications 
- Risk Assessment  
- Explosion Analysis  
 
  
Figure 7: Gudrun tie-in to Sleipner A (QRA Gudrun tie-in, 2009) 
 
Through the modifications of the Gudrun platform being tied-in to the Sleipner platform, a risk 
analysis has been performed to view any risk factors that can be related to SLA and SLT. 
 
The analysis indicates that the total risk results for SLA will increase in the installation phase of the 
Gudrun tie-in (QRA Gudrun tie-in, 2009). This increase is due to the fact that the manning onboard 
will increase due to the tie-in, as well as increased probability for ignition.  
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Nevertheless, the explosion risk will increase due to the increased equipment density. Potential 
accidental types have been determined as well as their risk and their FAR values. The values are 
based on previous case studies and statistics. Figure 8 illustrates the average FAR contributions per 
accident type (ERA Gudrun tie-in, 2009): 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Average FAR Contributions per Accident type (ERA Gudrun tie-in, 2009) 
  
Figure 8 indicates that the highest average FAR contributor is related to process accidents, but also 
working accidents and helicopter accidents. The risk involved when processing, working or 
transportation by a helicopter is thus high. The risk has been further evaluated with regards to the 
tie-in and risk reducing measures have been recommended based on the tie-in process to SLA and on 
previous tie-in cases. Hazardous situations and potential accidental events have been analyzed and 
their consequences have been calculated in the QRA. The requirements with regards to NORSOK 
Z013 (2010) have been evaluated in the risk analysis (ERA Gudrun tie-in, 2009). The risk analysis also 
evaluates specific elements that contribute to increasing the risk, for instance: 
 
- Field FAR 
The field FAR for the Sleipner field will increase due to Gudrun tie-in. This indicates an increase of 
0.04 with is lower than the acceptance criterion that is set to a maximum increase in field FAR of 0.1 
(QRA Gudrun tie-in, 2009). Risk reducing measures should be implemented to reduce the FAR value 
and thus the risk as low as reasonably practicable. 
 
- Personnel Group FAR 
It is assumed that the FAR for most exposed groups will increase linearly with FAR for SLA. The 
Personnel Group FAR of less than 25 is set by the operator company. The FAR for the most exposed 
personnel group will have a small increase due to the tie-in, but still be under the accepted criteria 
for FAR. This increase can be due to the fact that more personnel will be needed for the tie-in. Risk 
reducing measures should be discussed with regards to risk involved for the personnel. 
 
6 % 2 %
39 %
1 %3 %0 %
24 %
1 %
24 %
Extreme weather Earthquake Process accidents
Blowouts Riser accidents Dropped objects
Helicopter accidents Ship collisions Working accidents
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- Loss of main safety functions 
Increase in impairment frequencies for the main safety functions on SLA due to the Gudrun tie-in for 
process explosions will increase. The frequencies for escalation and escape routes will also increase 
due to the additional equipments (QRA Gudrun tie-in, 2009). This sets the impairment frequency per 
year for the total including Gudrun tie-in and the escalation and the escape routes values above 1.0E-
04, which is the requirement, set in NORSOK Z-013 (2010). The NORSOK standard has been used to 
evaluate the routes availability for loss of main safety functions. Further risk reducing measures 
should be implemented to reduce the risk involved.   
 
- Potential Loss of Life 
The Potential Loss of Life (PLL) is increasing due to the increased manning in the process modules. 
The total PLL for the Gudrun tie-in is higher than the total PLL for TRA. Risk reducing measures should 
be discussed and implemented to decrease the PLL and decrease the risk as low as reasonably 
practicable (QRA Gudrun tie-in, 2009). 
 
2.1.3 Risk Calculation and Risk Acceptance Criteria 
 
The risk calculation is performed by using the information available from the total risk analysis 
document of the Sleipner field, to build a standalone risk model for Gudrun Tie-in. The expected risk 
increase from Gudrun tie-in has been measured against risk acceptance criteria that are specified for 
the Gudrun project.  
 
The acceptance criteria are set as following (QRA Gudrun tie-in, 2009): 
 
- Overall personnel risk: The project shall not increase the FAR value on the Sleipner field. This 
means that the project shall not increase the FAR value on the Sleipner field with more than 
0.1. If it does increase, it should be compensated for, by implementing risk reducing 
measures in other areas of the field to bring the FAR value down again. 
- Loss of main safety functions: the project shall not increase the risk loss of main safety 
functions on SLA and SLT to more than 20% above the existing level before the project. 
Otherwise, risk reducing measures should be implemented in other areas of SLA and SLT to 
bring the increase in risk down again. 
- Personnel risk, most exposed group: The FAR value for the most exposed group shall be 
below the value that has been given by the operator company. 
 
The Risk Acceptance Criteria (RAC) have been determined before the risk analysis process had 
started (by the operating company). These acceptance criteria are then further used in the risk 
analysis process, changes to the accepted criteria cannot be made (QRA Gudrun tie-in, 2009). These 
risk acceptance criteria, illustrate that the overall personnel risk shall not increase the FAR value from 
the Sleipner field. Nevertheless if this does happen, risk reducing measures should be implemented 
to set the risk as low as reasonably possible, which in this case indicates below the FAR value.  
 
The loss of the main safety functions also need to have accepted criteria to ensure that the risk 
involved doesn’t pass the risk loss of main safety functions on SLA and SLT. The personnel that are 
most exposed to explosion, fire, pressure, heat, etc. also play a crucial role when it comes to risk and 
the risk involved with certain activities. Risk acceptance criteria are thus set for the most exposed 
group to ensure that the FAR value remain below the accepted limit. This is applicable for the 
installation and design phase of the project. The RAC have not been further compared with risk levels 
of similar industries, as required by NORSOK Z013 (2010). Nevertheless, risk acceptance criteria have 
been set for personnel and loss of main safety functions.  
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Damage to third party has not been included in this QRA (but in other internal evaluations performed 
by the operator company). The risk analysis shows that the RAC that are defined in the project are 
fulfilled. Nevertheless, it is suggested that even if the acceptance criteria are fulfilled, the potential 
for further reducing the risk related to the Gudrun tie-in should be considered. Thus, the risk 
reducing measures should contribute in further reducing the risk as low as reasonably possible.  
2.1.4 Hazard identification  
 
The Hazard Identification (HAZID) is a crucial part of the risk analysis process; it identifies the hazards 
that are involved in certain activities or events. Thus, through HAZID, risk is identified. Risk analysis 
presents the main features of field development and the critical areas that can be in conflict with 
RAC (HAZID Gudrun tie-in, 2009). Figure 9 illustrates how the risk analysis process is used to identify 
potential hazards:   
 
 
Figure 9: Risk analysis process (HAZID Gudrun tie-in, 2009) 
 
This risk analysis process starts with the planning phase, where risk acceptance criteria are 
determined, the systems are defined and the hazards are identified. Through evaluating 
consequence- and frequency analysis, the risk picture will be formed and the risk evaluations can 
start. From the risk analysis and evaluations, the risks and hazards involved will be identified and 
addressed, and by determining risk reducing measures the risk should to be reduced as low as 
reasonably practicable.  
 
The HAZID of Gudrun tie-in was limited to the modifications of topside of SLA (related to the pipeline, 
risers etc.). The modifications at SLT and risks during the installation period were not covered in the 
HAZID analysis. Through the HAZID analysis the risks have been classified in critical and non-critical 
hazards for subsequent analysis (HAZID Gudrun tie-in, 2009). The HAZID analysis has been performed 
throughout 5 meetings with the stakeholders in the operating and contractor companies. Governing 
documents from the operator company and documents related to SLA and Gudrun have been used in 
addition to previous created HAZID analysis used for other tie-in modifications. Most of the 
information is based on the RAC, previously created HAZID analysis and risk analysis.  
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For the Gudrun tie-in to Sleipner field, a total of 21 risk factors are identified and evaluated (HAZID 
Gudrun tie-in, 2009).  The risk factors indicate the elements that can contribute to risk increase. The 
ranking of the risk factors where ranked from 1 to 5, using a computerised tool for risk assessment, 
where: 
 
Number Rank 
1 Unacceptable 
2 Poor 
3 Acceptable 
4 Good 
5 Perfect 
Table 7: Risk factors rankings (HAZID Gudrun tie-in, 2009) 
 
The risk factors indicate the elements or events that contribute in increased risk, so the lower the 
ranking of the risk factors, the higher the risk is. The building blocks indicate the changes that will 
occur due to the tie-in and the ranking/score of the risk involved will then be given. Comments and 
actions are given (where needed) to implement for instance risk reducing measures or further 
evaluations. The summary of the risk factors contains the following 2 factors that are related to fire 
and explosion exposure: 
 
Building block Risk factor Score Comments Action 
Modifications, 
extension of 
existing plant 
Fire/Explosion 
exposure of main 
support structure 
3 Existing segments will not be 
significantly affected 
Needs 
“guideline 
evaluation” 
Riser inside 
concrete shaft 
Fire 1 The design load of J-tubes is 
important and should be 
verified 
Needs separate 
“explosion 
study” 
Table 8: Example of Risk factors (HAZID Gudrun tie-in, 2009) 
 
These so-called actions are then further discussed with the operator company to determine further 
actions, if any. In the HAZID analysis of Gudrun tie-in (2009), it is also stated that introduction of 
more equipment in an area will result in more frequent fires, longer fire durations or explosion 
probabilities. Therefore, hazards have been identified and risk reducing measures have been 
determined and actions are set. 
 
One of the important hazards identified is the risk factor “Fire” (see Table 8). For this risk factor, is it 
stated that the riser will not be exposed to fires on the sea surface, but rather inside the shaft where 
the riser will sustain a short lasting fire. With 2 or more gas risers the internal explosion risk is a 
major concern. Elimination of ignition sources or inserting of the shaft atmosphere can be 
implemented as risk reducing measures. Thus, through the HAZID process, risk is analyzed and 
identified for different activities. Since this process is done through a computerised tool, the 
information available is restricted and no further explanations have been given with regards to the 
different risk factors (HAZID Gudrun tie-in, 2009). 
 
In addition to the hazard identifications, sensitivity analysis also plays a crucial role in the 
quantitative risk analysis. The sensitivity analysis include contributes to the hazard identification 
process and thus the process of identifying risk and the vulnerable activities involved (Sensitivities 
Gudrun tie-in, 2009).  
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The sensitivity analysis presents the measures that can be taken to reduce the risk of hazards and/or 
given sensitivities. The following measures are presented in the sensitivity analysis (Sensitivities 
Gudrun tie-in, 2009): 
 
- Subsea Isolation Valves 
There will be added SubSea Isolation Valves (SSIVs) to the two new pipelines. The main effect of SSIV 
is the significant reducing in leak and fire duration. In addition, SSIV reduces fire durations and thus 
minimize the material damages in case of a fire scenario, both economical, health, safety and 
environmentally wise.  
 
-Emergency Shutdown Valves 
Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDV) can be placed on the upstream bridge over to SLT, but this will 
result in an increase of the leak rate but a reducing of the fire durations. Further analysis is needed 
should this valve be placed there. 
 
- Fire walls  
There has been build a new balcony outside a part of the Gudrun platform. As a result, the fire walls 
towards the neighbouring modules are planned to be extended, but the effect of shorter fire walls on 
ventilation is small. Furthermore, the effect on explosion loads is small related to the base case 
modification.  
 
- Increased explosion risk 
Simulations of the balcony on D22 showed that the explosion frequency increased with 10% due to 
reduced ventilation.  
 
 
Figure 10: Geometric model of the SLA platform (TRA Sleipner, 2004)  
 
The consequences of an explosion are 100% fatalities in the module and 50% in the neighbouring 
modules (Sensitivities Gudrun tie-in, 2009). These explosions may lead to damage or loss to the main 
safety functions, which are escalation and escape routes. If the explosion frequency increases with 
10% the risk results will still be below the acceptance criteria. The field FAR criterion of maximum 
increase of 0.1 is barely fulfilled, with an increase of 0.09. Risk reducing measures have been 
proposed to reduce the risk involved for the planned modifications on D22 (TRA Sleipner, 2004). 
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Figure 11: Planned modification on D22 (TRA Sleipner, 2004) 
 
The consequences related to the sensitivity analysis are based on previous experience and previous 
case studies. Several calculations have been illustrated in the sensitivity analysis illustrating what the 
risks are (in different areas) and which measures should be carried out, based on the ALARP 
principle. FAR and PLL values have been used to illustrate the effects of the risk reducing measures. 
For instance leak frequencies and their consequences have been calculated to demonstrate the 
importance of implementing the risk reducing measures to reduce the risk as low as reasonably 
practicable.  
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2.1.5 Risk reducing measures 
 
Risk reducing measures have been addressed as ALARP measures to indicate that the ALARP principle 
is used when the risk reducing measures have been determined. However, no further explanation 
has been given regarding the ALARP principle (QRA Gudrun tie-in, 2009).  
 
It can be noted from the risk analysis that one ALARP measure could lead to increased risk in the 
installation phase, namely the removal of equipment for the inactive wells at SLA. The risk involved 
for having the equipments available for the inactive wells was not acceptable and risk reducing 
measures were suggested.  The removal of the equipment for the inactive wells also involves risk. It 
is recommended by the company that has created the risk analysis that the operator carries out 
further risk calculations (QRA Gudrun tie-in, 2009).  
 
To get an overview over all the hazards and sensitivities that are present when carrying out the tie-in, 
a sensitivity analysis has been performed to view the sensitivities and the risks involved. This 
sensitivity analysis for the Gudrun tie-in to Sleipner shows among others, that the following ALARP 
measures have been recommended to prevent any increase in the risk involved (Sensitivities Gudrun 
tie-in, 2009): 
 
Recommended ALARP measures 
SubSea Isolation Valves (SSIVs) have been evaluated as a risk reducing measure, due to the fact that 
they contribute to significant reducing of leak and fire durations in case of riser/pipeline accidents. 
Avoiding flanges upstream the riser Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDVs) has been evaluated; the 
risk contribution is not significant, but ESDV is recommended as a risk reducing measure. 
It is also recommended that guideline evaluations should be carried out to determine dimensioning 
of fire durations to determine the overall risk picture 
A leak occurring on the balcony may spread more easily to the areas below if the balcony deck is 
grated instead of plated. Therefore a plated deck has been evaluated and recommended as a 
suitable solution. 
A relocation of the metering package is recommended even if it will have small impact on the 
personnel risk level and the frequencies for impairment of the main safety functions on SLA. 
However, relocation of the metering package will have a positive effect by reducing the impairment 
frequency of the escape route over to SLR 
The removal of equipment for the inactive wells at SLA can lead to a significant reduction on 
explosion loads in the module and thus as a risk reducing measure. 
Table 9: Recommended ALARP measures (Sensitivities Gudrun tie-in, 2009) 
 
The ALARP measures have been determined through the HAZID process that has been performed 
with help of relevant personnel, as well as experienced personnel. In addition, best practices and 
previous studies and experience has been implemented to complete the risk analysis and determine 
risk reducing measures. These recommendations will then be further discussed and approved by the 
operator company before any measures can be taken. The risk reducing measures are explained as in 
the Table above, no further information has been given with regards to whom, at what time and how 
the risk reducing measures should be implemented (Sensitivities Gudrun tie-in, 2009).  
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The risk reducing measures have been determined to contribute in preventing and controlling 
incidents and thus reducing the probability of them. However, the probabilities have not been 
illustrated in the QRA. The consequences of the risk reducing measures have been calculated in the 
QRA for the risk reducing measures. For instance for the risk reducing measure related to 
implementing new SSIVs; 
 
1. In General (the description on what the SSIV is and what effect it will have on the new 
pipelines) 
2. Risk and Risk calculations; leak frequencies have been calculated/ simulated based on having 
the SSIV and not implementing the SSIV 
3. Consequence calculations have been performed as well as comparing the situation without 
implementing the SSIVs. The consequences have been discussed for the personnel, main 
safety functions and accident potentials when having the SSIVs and without the SSIVs 
4.  Conclusion is given and arguments have been given with regards to implementing the SSIVs. 
The main effect of the SSIV is the reduction potential it has on leak/ fire durations. Hence the 
consequences of the scenarios are minimized with the SSIVs, thus the risk is reduced.  
 
The risk analysis has this structure for all the risk reducing measures (risk identification, risk reducing 
measure, consequence and conclusion). The results of the risk reducing measures do not further 
explain how the risk reducing measures have been identified. In addition, statistics have not been 
taken into consideration to illustrate the importance of the risk reducing measure. In addition, no 
alternatives have been given to the risk reducing measures that are recommended. The operator 
company is further in charge of selecting the risk reducing measures and implementing them.  
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2.2 Case II: Sleipner field 
 
The second Case study is related to the Total Risk Analysis (TRA) that has been performed for the 
Sleipner field. This subsection will discuss all the elements of the TRA that contribute in identifying 
risk and risk reducing measures.  
 
Risk and risk reducing measures have been presented and analyzed to give an indication of how risk 
and risk reducing measures have been identified and addressed.   
 
 
2.2.1 System description 
 
The Sleipner field started its production in 1993. The field initially consisted of Sleipner A, Sleipner R 
(SLR) and the flare platform; these three plants got the name Sleipner East. In 1996 the production 
started in Sleipner West as well, which consisted of the installations Sleipner B and Sleipner T. 
Sleipner T is connected to Sleipner A through a bridge.  Sleipner B is an unmanned wellhead platform 
controlled from Sleipner A (TRA Sleipner, 2004).  
 
 
 
Figure 12: Sleipner A platform (TRA Sleipner, 2004) 
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2.2.2 Risk Analysis 
 
The second case will thus be regarding the Sleipner field. A risk- and emergency analysis has been 
performed for the Sleipner installations from September 2002 until June 2004. The most important 
parameters that are taken into consideration are the fire and explosion barriers, escape routes, the 
technical demand for the safety systems as well as the design of the emergency preparedness 
elements. The main purpose for the total risk analysis that is used was to update the risk picture that 
was portrayed from 1995 until 1999. Focus was set on the physical and operational changes that had 
been performed on the field.  The analysis covers the entire Sleipner field with the assumption that 
the surrounding plats and fields like Alfa North, the Sleipner West compression and Ormen Lange are 
installed and functioning (TRA Sleipner, 2004).  
 
The total risk analysis is used as a tool to support and handle risk that is connected to running a 
business. It’s a systematic method for identifying the main contributions to the risk level, as well as 
knowledge needed to start the risk reducing measures identification to reduce the risk. In the total 
risk analysis it is stated that identifying unwanted events and possible dangers should be performed 
by experienced personnel who have the knowledge on the actual activities. Considering the 
frequencies, it should be done on a global level by collected historical data combined with data 
collected from experience and activity levels of the analysed field (TRA Sleipner, 2004).  
 
The risk analysis method used is illustrated in Figure 13: 
 
 
Figure 13: Risk analysis method for Case II (TRA Sleipner, 2004) 
 
An event tree analysis has been used to set the probability for certain events occurring. The Risk 
Based Inspection (RBI) inspects for instance oil pipelines and suggests inspection intervals or other 
measures according to the risk level it was initially set to. These recommendations and measures are 
further used in the TRA for Sleipner. 
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2.2.3 Risk Calculation and Risk Acceptance Criteria  
 
The RAC used in the TRA for Sleipner are determined by the operator in charge, before the risk 
analysis process was started. The acceptance criteria for managing health, safety and environment 
state that the following, regarding the risk that is considered acceptable for the Sleipner field (TRA 
Sleipner, 2004): 
 
- The overall personnel: the average individual risk, expressed in FAR must meet the criteria 
set by the operator company. The same elements have been taken into consideration for the 
PLL value.  The average should be calculated for all the personnel on the installation with an 
average period of one year.  
- Loss of main safety functions: The risk of material losses is also taken into consideration, 
thus the material losses contribute to the economical losses. The acceptance criteria chosen 
should give the most optimal economical solution. Hence, risk reducing measures are taken 
when the reduction in expected loss is greater than the cost of the measure. The acceptance 
criteria have also taken into consideration the risk of damage to the environment. 
- Personnel risk, most exposed group: the FAR for the most exposed group is set to by the 
operator company. This is for the entire Sleipner field.  
 
In many cases, it should be possible to achieve a lower risk level than the ones set by the acceptance 
criteria. Alternative solutions and risk reducing measures should be mapped and implemented when 
the beneficial value is considered greater that the disadvantages, even if the risk level satisfies the 
minimum requirements. These risk acceptance criteria contribute in setting a limit to the risk that is 
considered acceptable (TRA Sleipner, 2004).  
 
The RAC values had been divided into two groups: 
1. Acceptance criteria that have been determined by the operator company before the risk 
analysis process has started. These RAC values are more general and illustrate the RAC with 
respect to health, safety, security and the environment. The risk related to personnel and 
fatalities has been determined with FAR values, the ALARP principle has been used to 
indicate that the risk reducing measures should be able to achieve a lower risk level. Risk 
shall be defined for personnel, main safety functions and for the environment. 
2. Acceptance criteria have also been determined that are specified to the Sleipner field. The 
RAC from the operator company have been used to determine the RAC that are specified for 
the Sleipner field. This is thus an addition to the RAC that have been determined by the 
operator company (point one). In the Sleipner specific RAC the acceptance criteria with 
regards to PLL and FAR that are connected to SLA and SLB. RAC have also been identified for 
third party and different areas of the Sleipner field. 
 
This subdivision of RAC values set by the operator company in general and RAC values determined 
for a specific field make the risk analysis and the RAC more clearly. Through this process of explaining 
and using more time to clarify the RAC, the risk analysis becomes much more understandable and 
better defined. The demonstration and explanation process of how the risk analysis has been 
performed and how the operator- and consulting company view the different values as risk, RAC, risk 
reducing measures, ALARP etc., interprets and illustrates their understanding and their values.  
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2.2.4 Hazard identification  
 
The TRA of Sleipner A has an own document regarding the term risk, called Risk analysis which 
clarifies the explanation of the term risk. This document explains why the risk analysis has been 
performed, with the help of experienced personnel, statistics, preciously created risk analysis, 
internal documents from the operator company and from the consulting companies.  
 
Through explaining important terms as risk, an indication is given of how the term is further used in 
the risk analysis and how they have defined risk. For the TRA risk has been defined as probability 
multiplied by consequence, which is a rather simplified version of the definition. This has been 
further evaluated in the TRA with the help of a system description, hazards identifications and 
consequence modelling. In the TRA, the RAC, risk reducing measures, the ALARP principle and other 
important definitions have been explained in their own chapters. Through explaining the content and 
the definitions used in the TRA, the risk analysis becomes much more understandable. The user that 
is reading the TRA gets a better understanding of how the consulting companies have performed the 
TRA and how they have defined and identified risk and risk reducing measures. The definition risk has 
been explained as an expression of “absence of safety”. This is then used as a goal when determining 
the safety level of certain activities. It is further explained that the main perspective of the risk 
analysis is to identify the potential dangerous and unwanted events, asses the frequency/probability 
of occurrence (how often can this event occur?) and survey the consequences of the identified 
events.  
 
The identification of unwanted events often is determined within a group of experienced personnel, 
while the frequency of occurrence is based on statistics and how often the event has occurred in the 
past. After the frequency and the consequences have been determined, the next step is to evaluate 
whether the risk is acceptable or not with the help of RAC. This process is also carried out by a group 
of experienced personnel. The risk that is involved for personnel is identified using FAR and PLL 
values. Risk reducing measures, in accordance with the ALARP principle, are then identified and 
determined also with the help of experienced personnel.  The evaluation for the frequencies of loss 
in the head safety functions has been analysed in the technical report. The main safety functions that 
are evaluated include (TRA Sleipner, 2004): 
 
- Preventing escalation 
- Structural integrity 
- Protection of critical areas 
- Protection of safe areas 
- Maintaining escape routes 
 
The report concludes that SLA and SLT have high frequencies for escalating from the existing area to 
a new area related to fire and explosions scenarios. For SLR the frequency for loss of the main safety 
functions is related to the blow down functions due to fires. The frequencies for loss of the main 
safety functions are compared for SLA, SLT and SLR for fires, explosions, falling loads that can lead to 
fires, helicopter accidents, ship accidents, working accidents, extreme weather and earthquakes etc. 
The highest frequencies are related to loss of modules and decks; no cost benefit analysis of the 
measures has been performed to reduce the frequencies. However, hazard identifications and 
sensitivity analysis indicate where the potential risks are, and then risk reducing measures can be 
determined to reduce the risk as low as reasonably practicable (TRA Sleipner, 2004). 
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The risk analysis has primarily been used for the establishment of the scenario descriptions and to 
describe the defined hazards and accidents. Updating the risk analysis has been done in parallel with 
the work of the EPA. Through the risk analysis, the EPA has received input to the scope and 
description of the defined situations and scenarios. Furthermore, the EPA retrieves information from 
the risk analysis to identify which events are set as main designs for the emergency response 
(frequency, consequence). The EPA will set the standards for how each defined hazard and accident 
should be handled (TRA Sleipner, 2004). 
 
HAZID has been used to determine the hazards- and accident activities or events, which further have 
been evaluated in the potential accidents analysis. The hazards that have been identified are divided 
into more general accidents that can occur (like fire, explosions, leaks, dropped objects etc.) and the 
accidents that are Sleipner specific. For the latent, the hazards have been defined with regards to the 
emergency preparedness, for instance: 
 
- Personnel accidents 
- Lost of control functions 
- Acute emission of harmful substances 
- Fire, explosion, leaks with regards to specific areas on the Sleipner field 
 
Through this hazards and accident identification analysis, the risk has been illustrated for different 
activities in different areas. Where the risk was considered not acceptable, risk reducing measures 
were considered and determined by the operator and consulting company.    
 
The TRA of Sleipner also illustrates the risk that is considered acceptable with help of the FAR. This 
has been illustrated for: 
 
- The operator company: the FAR values have been calculated based on statistics from the 
operator company 
- Other operator companies in the Norwegian continental shelf: the FAR values have been 
illustrated for the Norwegian continental shelf (no further explanation was given to where 
this information was taken from) 
- The Sleipner field: the FAR values have been demonstrated for the Sleipner field with regards 
to hazard- and accident identification. In addition, the FAR values have been compared to 
FAR values that had been determined through the last TRA, which was performed in 1999. It 
is indicated that the risk is reduced due to updates and modifications that have been 
performed throughout the last years as well as increase in knowledge that has been 
implemented through new equipments (new types of ventilations, risers, new tools for 
explosion simulations etc.) 
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2.2.5 Risk reducing measures 
 
In addition to setting the acceptance criteria, the TRA should include evaluation of the ALARP 
process. Based on the calculated risk level on the Sleipner field, which is above the accepted criteria, 
the Sleipner operations should address alternative solutions and potential risk reducing measures. 
Hence, the best measure should be implemented when the benefit is set to be greater than the loss 
or the advantage bigger than the disadvantage. The TRA gives some concrete actions and measures 
that are recommended, but states that other measures can be taken beyond the given examples. 
However, these ‘other’ actions or measures have not been identified (TRA Sleipner, 2004). 
 
For instance, replacement of the flange connection with compact flanges to reduce leak frequencies 
in the leak source, since compact flanges have been used in the past with less leak rates than the 
traditional flange connection. This measurement can reduce the risk regarding the personnel as well 
as reducing the frequency for loss of the main safety functions. When improving the ventilations in 
an area where hydrocarbon leaks can occur, the best measure is undertaken to reduce the ignition 
probability. This measurement has been implemented in different areas in SLA and SLT. Again, this 
measurement can reduce the risk regarding the personnel as well as reducing the frequency for loss 
of the main safety functions. Other measures are also given to reduce the ignition probability.  
 
It is recommended in the TRA that there are minimal personnel in a process area. To reduce risk, the 
average personnel in a process area should thus be reduced. This will directly affect the risk 
regarding the personnel. Risk reducing measures (in the TRA addressed as ALARP measures) have 
been suggested by evaluating the potential risks involved through hazards identification and 
sensitivity analysis, with the usage of the ALARP principle. 
 
As in Case 1, the ALARP measures have been determined through the HAZID process that has been 
performed with help of relevant personnel, as well as experienced personnel. Also best practices and 
previous studies and experience have been implemented to complete the risk analysis and determine 
risk reducing measures. These recommendations will then be further discussed and approved by the 
operator company before any measures can be taken. FAR values have been determined in the 
HAZID, whenever the FAR values were considered high or close to the accepted limit/ criteria, risk 
reducing measures had been proposed. Some of the risks reducing measures included (TRA Sleipner, 
2004): 
- Reduction of leak rate: by for instance implementing compact flange or replacements of the 
traditional flange connections. The reduction of leak rate will be an effective measure for 
reducing the personnel risk and reduce the rate of loss of the main safety functions.  
- Reducing the ignition probability: improving the ventilations, reducing the personnel working 
in the warmer areas and increased segmentation of large process segments. 
- Reducing the staffing/personnel: the reduction in risk (measured in FAR) can be obtained by 
reducing the manning in particular areas. 
- Accidents at work: the measured FAR value is based on the average events that occur on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf.   
- Reducing the rate for loss of main safety functions: most of the risk related has been 
obtained from other studies (for instance the Ormen Lange studies) and measures had been 
suggested based on that (related to construction, modifications, implementations, new 
equipments, tools etc.) 
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2.3 Case III: Troll A – Pre Compression 
 
The third and last case study presents the Concept Risk Analysis (CRA) for the installation of pre-
compressors, at the Troll A platform. This is a modification risk analysis, which will evaluate the risk 
involved in modifying the Troll A platform. The CRA has been presented and analyzed to determine 
the risk and risk reducing identification for this concept risk analysis. 
 
2.3.1 System description 
 
The Troll A platform is placed 80 km north-west of Bergen, Norway. The Troll A platform produces oil 
and exports gas from Troll B and C platforms to Kollsnes.  
 
The main process of Troll A, was originally designed with gas/ liquid separation only, as the Troll East 
reservoir pressure was high enough to export the gas/ liquid to Kollsnes without gas compression 
(CRA Troll A, 2011). As gas is produced, the Troll East reservoir pressure is continuously reduced. 
Therefore, modifications should be made in the main topside process to maintain the export rate. 
These modifications are (CRA Troll A, 2011): 
 
Year Modification 
2005 Two pre-compressors with electrical drive system were included 
2011 Installation of a third export line to Kollsnes in order to lower the gas export pressure 
2015 It is planned to install two new pre-compressors with electrical drive system 
2024 Planned tie-in of Troll West Gas Province 
Table 10: Modifications in Troll A (CRA Troll A, 2011) 
 
The overview of the pre-compression (in M11- Compressors 3&4) project is illustrated in Figure 14: 
 
 
Figure 14: Troll A Pre-Compressor overview (CRA Troll A, 2011) 
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2.3.2 Risk Analysis 
 
The third Case will thus be regarding the concept of an installation of pre-compressors of the Troll A 
platform. The concept risk analysis is of the modifications on the Troll A platform and has been 
performed to identify any risk that might contribute to changing the risk perception of the Troll A 
platform. The analysis was performed in 2011 (CRA Troll A, 2011). 
 
The risk increase that might occur has been measured against the operators risk acceptance criteria, 
as described in Section 2.3.3. The technical report contains the following technical notes, as part of 
the Concept Risk Analysis (CRA Troll A, 2011): 
 
- HAZID 
- Explosion and Fire Analysis 
- Ventilation, Wind Analysis 
- ALARP evaluations 
- Risk Reducing Measures 
- Emergency Preparedness Analysis 
- Risk Analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Troll A platform (CRA Troll A, 2011) 
 
The risk analysis has been performed in accordance with the internal documents and standards from 
the operating company in addition to NORSOK Z013 (2010). The risk analysis reflects the changes to 
personnel and loss of main safety functions expressed using FAR and PLL values. The risk analysis is 
then further used to update the TRA for Troll A. Where needed, existing data and results from the 
existing TRA for Troll A have been used for calculating certain events. The major risks involved with 
installation of the pre-compression are changes in process accidents, changes in explosion risk and 
dropped objects; most of this data is taken from the existing TRA for Troll A (CRA Troll A, 2011).  
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In the risk analysis process Event Tree Analysis (ETA) has been used to calculate the leak frequencies 
(which have been set as the top events) that can occur due to ignition, strong explosions, blowout 
failures, fire water failure and escalation to equipment within an area. Thus, the ETA results in 
different end events, for instance (CRA Troll A, 2011): 
 
- Un-ignited leaks 
- Local fire due to external to internal ignition 
- Strong explosions due to external or internal ignition 
  
The consequences of the fire and explosion scenarios are further described with respect to the PLL 
values and the impairment with the loss of the main safety functions. The PLL is calculated based on 
the probability of fatalities in the area multiplied with the average manning in the area.  
 
The pre-compression project gives small increase in risk for the most exposed personnel group, but 
the risk for this group is still well below the tolerance criterion. The risk also increases in the 
installation phase due to the increased manning on the platform. Nevertheless, the FAR values still 
remain under the tolerance criterion (CRA Troll A, 2011).   
 
The analysis related to the loss of the main safety functions summarizes that the frequency of 
impairment of main safety functions due to fire and explosions are relatively high. ALARP measures 
should be taken to protect the loss of the main safety functions like escape ways.   
 
The risk analysis process identifies all the hazards and risks that might occur and risk reducing 
measures are then presented to reduce the risk to as low as reasonably practicable. Risk is the main 
focus and has been implemented in every aspect of the analysis. The risks involved in for instance 
collisions, explosions or dropped objects have been explained and the results have been compared 
with the risk acceptance criteria. Where needed, risk reducing measures have been suggested to 
keep the risk as low as reasonably practicable.  
 
For this case study, additional analysis and reports had been implemented in the risk analysis for 
instance reports regarding meetings between stakeholders, methodology, quality analysis and 
project management. This additional information was given shortly, in a separate chapter that was 
regarding the methodology used in the risk analysis, including information regarding kick off 
meetings, presentation meetings, weekly status reports etc (CRA Troll A, 2011, Appendix A). A 
document created internally for the operating company contains all the information regarding 
meetings and methodology used. 
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2.3.3 Risk Calculation and Risk Acceptance Criteria 
 
The risk calculation is performed by using the information available from the CRA document to build 
a standalone risk model for the Troll A pre-compressor. The expected risk increase from the pre-
compression has been measured against risk acceptance criteria that are specified for the project. 
 
The acceptance criteria have been determined by the operator company and are set as following 
(CRA Troll A, 2011): 
 
- Individual Personnel Risk (FAR): the overall FAR value for the personnel at the Troll A 
platform shall meet the criterion that has been determined by the operator company (which 
is the maximum value for the FAR). 
- Loss of main safety functions: the probability of loss for defined main safety functions shall 
be lower than 10-4 per year per safety function. This is set per accident type as; fires, 
explosions, collisions, dropped objects and environmental loads.  
- Personnel group: The FAR for all personnel groups shall meet the criteria of FAR below the 
value of 25. 
 
These risk acceptance criteria indicate that the risk should not be higher than the criterion that has 
been determined as acceptable. The risk acceptance criteria have been further used in the analysis 
for the results of the event trees that have been used to calculate risk. The values and results from 
the analysis have been compared to the risk acceptance criteria throughout the analysis to ensure 
that the results are in compliance with the acceptance criteria. If the results are high or higher than 
the determined RAC values, risk reducing measures have been recommended to keep the risk as low 
as reasonably practicable.  
  
The RAC values for the personnel risk has been divided into overall FAR, area FAR and personnel 
group FAR; the risk acceptance criteria have been set with regards to FAR values. This has been done 
in cooperation between the operating company and the contracting company that is preparing the 
risk analysis. 
 
The risk that can be involved is then identified with the help of a systematic HAZID analysis. The 
HAZID report has been used as the first step to identifying potential accidental events, both for the 
operational and installation phase. As a part of identifying hazards and thus risks, barrier elements 
have been identified. After the barriers have been determined the risk reducing measures that can 
be implemented are discussed. Based on the hazard identification, event trees and statistical data or 
previous experience have been used to calculate the risk involved. Several tools (from the operating 
company and from the company preparing the risk analysis) have been used to calculate the effects 
of identified accidents or hazards.   
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2.3.4 Hazard identification  
 
The Hazard identification methodology for the CRA for Troll A is the same as the one used for the 
QRA of the Gudrun tie-in (see Figure 9). The analysis follows the requirements determined by the 
operating company’s guidelines for concept risk analyses for major modifications. 
 
The HAZID was used to identify possible hazards due to the new pre-compressors. The HAZID 
includes a rough classification into critical and non-critical hazards for subsequent analysis. In 
addition, the HAZID suits as a familiarization to the project with identification of design basis for the 
project and subjects that should be focused in the preparation for operation. The HAZID was used to 
identify hazards related to (CRA Troll A, 2011): 
 
- Personnel injury (fatalities) 
- Pollution to the environment  
- Major asset damage 
- Undesired operational problems   
 
The HAZID check list contains (CRA Troll A, 2011): 
 
- Technical safety (leak/ignition sources, explosion venting, dropped objects etc.) 
- Working environment (fall/ height differences, hot/cold surfaces etc.) 
- Environmental (biological hazards, ergonomic hazards, toxic substances etc.) 
 
The identified hazards were then classified into the following four categories (CRA Troll A, 2011): 
 
Risk classification Description 
1 The area (room, system) does not give any safety concerns (e.g. does not 
contain any potential hazardous substances) 
2 The area (room, system) introduces safety concerns, but the risk factor is 
known to be small from other similar concepts 
3 The area (room, system) contains hazardous substances and/or introduces 
other safety concerns. The risk factor shall be quantified in QRA 
4 The area (room, system) contains hazardous substance or the arrangement 
produces safety concerns, which are unique, special to this concept. New risk 
estimates are required to conclude an acceptability 
Table 11: Risk Classifications (CRA Troll A, 2011) 
 
An Emergency Preparedness Analysis (EPA) has been reported in accordance with the standard 
presented in NORSOK Z013 (2010). The Troll A pre-compression project will to some degree affect 
the emergency preparedness at Troll A (CRA Troll A, 2011): 
  
- For the operational phase some of the scenarios will be changed, due to new equipment and 
modules, while for the installation phase the manning level and new activities (lifting, 
demolition, etc.) will affect the dimensioning of the emergency preparedness. Based on this, 
several actions are suggested for the operational and installation phase.  
- For the installation phase, the main reason for the increase in risk is the increased manning 
and the changed manning distribution, where more people will be working closer to areas 
with higher risks. Solutions to reduce the risk are given. 
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To carry out the EPA, the following activities were evaluated (CRA Troll A, 2011): 
 
- Familiarization with TRA and emergency preparedness requirements at Troll A 
- Evaluation of the effect of the CRA results including HAZID and installation risk analysis for 
the both operational and installation phase 
- Evaluation of the effect of the CRA results including HAZID and installation risk analysis on 
the requirements to emergency preparedness dimensioning for both the operational and 
installation phase 
- Conclusions and suggestions to further actions to secure the required level of emergency 
preparedness at Troll A  
 
The EPA included the risks involved with regards to explosions, leakages, dropped objects, collision 
etc. The EPA for the pre-compression has been further implemented in the updated TRA of Troll A. 
Table 11 gives an indication of how comprehensive the EPA was carried out: 
 
Operational Phase 
 Must make sure that alarm signals are audible and visible in the new modules  
Must give training/information to relevant personnel about the new modules to reduce risk 
Verify that no escape route is affected by the new equipment and that all areas, including new 
modules, have two escape ways. This is to reduce the risk. 
Installation Phase 
It must be verified that the installation of the pre-compression equipment do not interfere with the 
possibilities to notify all personnel 
Make sure that all personnel onboard have the necessary training regarding emergency 
preparedness 
Must evaluate having temporary firewater cannons or other solutions to reduce the risk 
Establish bridging emergency preparedness document for the lifting vessels 
Must make sure that there are enough first aid personnel onboard, even in the periods with the 
highest manning 
Table 12: EPA (CRA Troll A, 2011) 
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2.3.5 Risk reducing measures 
 
The risk reducing measures for this case study have also been referred to as ALARP measures, as in 
Case 1 and 2. The process of determining risk reducing measures identifies the primary contributors 
to risk changes and proposes adequate risk reducing measures. The ALARP measures have been 
determined through best practice, experience and simulations that can contribute in determining the 
risks that are involved in specific scenarios.  
 
The following sensitivity cases for ALARP evaluations are analysed (CRA Troll A, 2011): 
 
- Changes in risks due to no fire wall between tow modules (M11 and TPK): no fire wall 
increases the risk for the personnel and further evaluations were performed 
- Changes in risks from M11 due to extra fire protection and escape probabilities from crane: 
the risk picture for Troll A does not change significantly  due to the crane 
- Risk changes from M11 due to inclusion of weather cladding on the module: the changes 
increase the NORSOK requirements and further analysis were performed  
 
The ALARP evaluations have been performed with the help of Event Tree calculations for (CRA Troll A, 
2011) 
- Internal and External Fire probabilities 
- Strong explosions 
- Blow down failure and Firewater failure 
- Escalation to other equipment due to fire 
 
These ALARP measures have been determined through the HAZID process that has been performed 
with help of relevant personnel, as well as experienced personnel. Best practices and previous 
studies and experience have been implemented to complete the risk analysis and determine risk 
reducing measures. These recommendations will then be further discussed and approved by the 
operator company before any measures can be taken. 
 
The risk reducing measures were determined through workshops with key personnel from the 
stakeholders involved where the following was covered: 
 
Operational phase 
Reduction of leak frequency (M11) 
Reduction of ignition probability (segment size, blow down, detection, electrical equipment etc.) 
Limit consequences of explosions (reinforcements, pressure relief, deluge) 
Limit consequences of fires (process equipment, fire fighting equipment, escape routes etc.)  
Installation phase 
With regards to the operational phases  
Reduction in manning 
Optimize manning distribution 
Demolition of fire/blast wall  
Other issues (Lifting activities, Supply vessels etc) 
Table 13: Risk reducing measures (CRA Troll A, 2011) 
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The results from the risk reducing measures workshop include a total number of 19 identified areas 
where measures have been discussed, where 5 are for the installation phase and 14 for the 
operational phase. It also indicates who is responsible (all contractors) for follow up of the risk 
reducing measures and it is stressed that it is necessary to document what further is done and how 
the measures are implemented. The following Table illustrates how the risk reducing measures have 
been presented in the risk analysis: 
 
Phase Cue word Hazard identification Measures Responsible  Due date 
Installation Blast wall  fire wall will be removed some 
time in advance 
of module installation. The risk 
for escalation to 
adjacent area in case of well 
accidents (leaks/blowouts) 
is close to accept criterion  
-Limit well operation 
when demolition has 
started 
-Postpone demolition of 
the firewall as long as 
possible 
-Consider H0 instead of 
A60 for EIT module 
-Temporary fire/blast wall 
(not the best solution as 
it will require additional 
construction activities, 
and the supports for the 
temporary wall will be in 
conflict with well 
intervention activities) 
Contractor (Not given) 
Installation Manning in 
a certain 
area 
High risk for personnel during 
construction. Exposed to 
process accidents and 
accidents due to well leaks. 
Reduce manning  
-Limit scope/period for 
installation  
-Supports can be fitted 
during shutdown 
-Hot work during 
shutdown. Limit habitat 
welding 
during operation 
Contractor (Not given) 
Installation Manning 
distribution 
Exposure of personnel. 
The main reason for the 
increase in risk level during 
installation is the increased 
manning in combination of 
changes in the manning 
distribution. I.e. more persons 
in 
high risk areas, or in vicinity of 
high risk areas. 
-Risk levels are still within 
risk acceptance 
criterion (info) 
-The correct manning level 
is not yet established, 
and ALARP measures for 
manning and manning 
distribution shall followed 
up later in the project 
 
 (Not given) 
Operational Fire 
protection 
Active fire protection is 
suggested. 
Extent of passive fire 
protection is needed 
Active systems are: 
-Deluge 
-Fire protection in compressor 
house 
-Dedicated deluge coverage 
for critical equipment 
Carry out fire integrity 
study. Assess results in 
combination with results 
from fire risk analysis 
 
Contractor (Not given) 
 Table 14: Risk reducing measures (CRA Troll A, 2011) 
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The measures are based on both qualitative and quantitative research meaning (CRA Troll A, 2011): 
 
- Qualitative research: contacted stakeholders, meetings, discussions etc. to gather 
information 
- Quantitative research: statistics and previous cases have been used to compare and collect 
information; all the input values have been included in the risk analysis. 
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Section 3: Discussion 
 
This Section will contain further analysis and discussion regarding the case studies presented in the 
previous Section.  
 
The main purpose of this Section is to evaluate how the risk is identified and addressed in the context 
of risk analyses, that is for the quantitative-, concept- and total risk analysis. In addition, the same 
will be done for risk reducing measures to present how they are identified and addressed. 
 
In Norway, the risk analysis process is required to follow the Norwegian regulations and the 
standards that are recommended. Therefore, the compliance with the regulations plays a crucial part 
in the risk analysis and is also evaluated. How much of the regulations and standards have been 
taken into consideration and how far have operator and consulting companies stretched themselves 
to reduce the risk to ALARP? 
 
Finally, a more general and potential improvement approach has been given to how the content of 
the risk analysis can be improved. This discussion is based on the three case studies and the views of 
the author of this thesis with regards to improvement potentials.  
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3.1 Case studies 
 
3.1.1 Regulations and Standards 
 
The regulations set by the authorities are a tripartite collaboration between the authorities, 
employers and the employees. These Norwegian regulations shall be applied and implemented in the 
petroleum industry. The Norwegian PSA’s viewpoints focus on quality, learning, competence and 
preventing, with the main focus being on risk (RVK, 2012).  The requirements set by the authorities 
have been analyzed in the risk analysis of the three cases. The main focus has been on harm and 
danger to people, and the risk analyses have been used to evaluate how the regulations and 
standards have been implemented in the three case studies.  
 
All three cases provide an overview of the acceptance criteria that is set by the operator and further 
applied in the risk analysis, with the main focus being personnel and assets. This is a requirement 
from the authorities as described in § 9 of the Management Regulations (2010). The RAC have been 
implemented with help of FAR values. The most exposed group of personnel has also been evaluated 
and acceptance criteria are set for them as well. The main safety functions are defined and further 
analyzed to ensure the safety of the personnel. Personnel working in and outside immediate accident 
area have been evaluated to ensure the escape routes and plans. For the quantitative risk analysis 
for Gudrun tie-in, the total risk analysis of Sleipner A and the concept risk analysis for the pre-
compression of Troll A, an EPA was presented in the risk analysis. Thus, the RAC fulfill the 
requirements that are given by the authorities. No further documentation or explanation was given 
regarding the accepted criteria and how or why they are defined as accepted criteria. This is not a 
requirement from the authorities, but to implement the underlying understanding of the accepted 
criteria can contribute in making the risk analysis more understandable. In addition, the RAC have 
been determined by the operating companies, but it would have been useful to involve and compare 
the accepted criteria with criteria that have been accepted for other similar activities/platforms or 
even with other operating companies. Through comparing RAC, the understanding of why a 
particular criterion is set as acceptable can be illustrated in a risk analysis.    
 
The risk analyses of all three cases provide a picture and overview of the risk associated with the 
different activities that are presented. The risk analyses provide support for decisions related to the 
upcoming events, as the Gudrun tie-in to Sleipner and the adding of the pre-compressors on Troll A 
platform. The risk involved for the risk related activities and events has been presented in the risk 
analysis for personnel and assets, as required in the Framework Regulations (2001) §11. This has 
been satisfied with the use of analysis regarding hazard identifications, sensitivity analysis and 
analysis regarding accident situations. Potential hazards and incidents have been identified and their 
consequences have been presented in the risk analyses for all three cases. The documentation part 
regarding potential incidents and their consequences could be improved with regards to how the risk 
analysis process reaches decisions regarding incidents and how their consequences could be. 
Furthermore, risk reducing measures have been proposed to reduce the risk as much as possible. The 
combination of harm and the degree of severity of the harm in the form of fatalities, personnel 
injuries and other health hazards has been measured and assessed in the risk analysis.  
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In the Guidelines of the Framework Regulations (2001), general principles have been presented 
regarding risk reducing principles. The ALARP principle has mainly been used in the three cases. The 
other principles (BAT-, Precautionary- and substitution principle) have also been used, but have not 
been given the same attention as the ALARP principle. The Best Available Technology (BAT) principle 
has been applied to some extent when determining the risk reducing measures, in very few elements 
of the three cases. The pre cautionary- and substitution principle haven’t been implemented, except 
briefly in Case II. But as the Informants from the consulting companies preparing the risk analysis, 
have discussed with each other and myself, the pre cautionary- and substitution principle has been 
implemented implicitly. However, the pre cautionary- and substitution principle should be more 
visible in the risk analysis by for instance implementing a section in the risk analysis regarding the 
alternative solutions or measures that can be implemented. The risk analysis should argument and 
discusses the limitations that are in the risk analysis. These limitations can be regarding information 
available, limited overview of risk reducing measures or lack of similar cases that the risk analysis can 
be compared to etc. The Guidelines (Framework Regulations, 2001) that are recommended regarding 
principles that could be implemented when determining the risk reducing measures, should be taken 
into account. If one of the principles, which have been suggested by the authorities, hasn’t been 
used, then the risk analysis should inform about that.   
 
The solutions and barriers, which have the greatest risk-reducing effect, have been chosen based on 
an individual level as well as an overall evaluation related to risk. To be able to accomplish the 
requirements and acceptance criteria for accidents in the regulations, NORSOK Z013 (2010) is 
recommended to be followed. As NORSOK standard Z013 states, in similarity with Section 17 of the 
Management Regulations (2010), the risk analysis should include identification of hazardous 
situations and potential accidental events. The identification of hazardous situations and potential 
accidental events has been included in the risk analysis. However, the causes of potential events and 
accidents haven’t been further evaluated, but the consequences and the risk reducing measures 
have been assessed in some degree. The requirements regarding the potential accidents in the 
quantitative risk analysis have been fulfilled and a document regarding analyses of accidents is 
created. The different types of accidents, e.g. process accidents, fire, explosion, failure etc., have 
been analyzed in all three cases. Nevertheless, the content of the analysis is not as comprehensive as 
it could have been, i.e. the documentation regarding the causes of accidents and the consequences 
should be implemented in the risk analysis. Also, even thought the risk analysis documents differ in 
having focus on a concept (as a tie-in to a platform or adding a pre-compressor) or total platform, all 
possible and different accident scenarios have to be evaluated, as stated in NORSOK Z013 (2010). The 
identification of the accidents should be detailed and precise to avoid confusion, moreover to satisfy 
the standards that are recommended. This is done in all three case studies; potential accidents and 
unwanted activities have been illustrated in the risk analysis, but again, the underlying understanding 
regarding for instance causes and why these activities have been selected in the risk analysis, should 
also be presented.    
 
The strategies recommended in ISO 13702 (1999) related to FES and EERS have been used in some 
extend, in all three cases. Lastly, the requirements set by the authorities have been satisfied. In 
addition, the internal requirements of the operator have been met, since the operator was involved 
in parts of the analysis process. The RAC have been pre-defined by the operating company and the 
ALARP principle has been used to determine the risk reducing measures as well as using the BAT in 
some degree. The solutions and measures are selected with respect to safety standards. However, 
operating and consulting companies should stretch themselves to go beyond the requirements that 
are set as minimum requirements. This can be done by, for instance following NORSOK or ISO 
standards in the fullest degree possible. By going beyond the minimum requirements, the operating 
companies and consulting companies will push themselves to get better, have more knowledge and 
improve their potentials with respect to HSE.  
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3.1.2 Risk 
 
The first Case is regarding the QRA of the Gudrun tie-in to Sleipner A. When a tie-in is planned for a 
platform the risk involved will increase due to the extra manning involved in the process. Throughout 
the risk analysis document, the risk concept is presented and used. Hazardous situations have been 
identified and potential accidental event have been presented with the use of event trees. However, 
the risk perception and understanding from the consulting company that has prepared the risk 
analysis, is not presented as a definition to make the risk presentation complete. The quantitative 
risk analysis starts with the Hazard Identification document where the potential risks have been 
identified and presented. The Potential Loss of Live (PLL) values and the Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) are 
calculated and evaluated for the potential hazards and risk related scenarios. The reasons for any 
increase in risk due to the tie-in have been presented and comparisons have been made with the 
Sleipner A to obtain an overview over the risk concept. The effect of the increase in risk has been 
evaluated and the consequences and the results are presented. 
 
The TRA of the Sleipner field (Case study II) has been performed by another consulting company than 
the one that performed Case I and III. The entire TRA was in Norwegian, as opposed to Case I and III 
that were presented in English. Furthermore, the degree of presentation of risk and risk identification 
differs from the other two. Before the analysis started, the concept and definition of risk and risk 
analysis was described and evaluated. This gives an overview of how risk is presented and identified 
throughout the rest of the analysis. The risk analysis process has been explained in detail, to ensure 
that the reader understands the process of identifying and calculating risk that is involved in the 
different events that may occur. In addition, to assure that risk and the risk definition is understood, 
all the additional definitions have been explained like the risk reducing measures, risk levels, risk 
contribution, FAR, PLL etc. The RAC are then listed in accordance with the risk picture that was 
described and the risk that is accepted for the personnel, loss of safety functions and risk for harming 
the environment.  
 
The CRA for the installation of the pre-compressors for Troll A (Case study III) introduces the risk 
definition in the different risk analysis stages. The same risk analysis methodology is used as the one 
from Case I (see Figure 9). Risk as a definition is not introduced as in Case II, but rather used 
throughout the hazard identification process. The RAC, which are determined by the operating 
company, have been introduced for individual personnel risk, overall personnel risk and the loss of 
main safety functions. The RAC have been presented through FAR values. The risk assessment is 
based on the results from the HAZID that was carried out for operational phases. The identification of 
risk changes due to the pre-compression, the risk related to the changes has been calculated in 
different accident scenarios. The risk contributions from the various process segments are estimated 
by using event tree models. The event trees present different top events that result in numerous 
consequences. The results of the event tree analysis summarize the risk picture on a format that is 
required for comparison of the risk acceptance criteria. The main risk factors were risk for personnel 
and the impairment of the main safety functions; they have been calculated with FAR values and PLL.  
 
There are HAZID workshops to identify and address the risks for the three cases, in addition the 
experience of senior consultants and previous case studies are used. Hence, a group of experts is put 
together that are familiar with the integrity and equipments that is used, to find the HAZIDs. It is 
important to stress that HAZIDs should not be the same, time after time, which often is the case. 
New techniques and updated methods should be used to identify other potential hazards. Even 
before starting the risk analysis process, qualitative analysis can be taken into consideration to 
discuss the potential hazards that can be involved. Risk and hazard identification is based on 
assessments and understanding of people that are involved in the risk analysis process and all 
stakeholders should therefore be involved.  
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Risk, as described in Section 2, can be expressed as “the uncertainty regarding what the outcome/ 
consequences are of a given activity” (Aven et al., 2004). Since, Case 1 and 2 haven’t expressed their 
definition of risk, the risk definition is difficult to capture from the risk analysis. The reader of the risk 
analysis then has to create his/her own understanding of risk. The expression from Section 2 is 
related to uncertainty that can be linked to the outcome of a given activity. Therefore, it is crucial to 
demonstrate this uncertainty. The uncertainty related to personnel, main safety functions or to the 
environment. Often, in the oil industry and in risk analysis, risk is presented as probability multiplied 
with the consequence. This definition and presentation of risk is then quite simplified. As Aven et al. 
(2004) presents risk related to uncertainty and consequence of a given activity, the understanding of 
risk will give a better understanding of risk and the uncertainties that are involved with risk. 
However, uncertainty revolved around not being able to predict, with reasonable certainty, what the 
outcome of an activity, event or measure will be (Aven et al., 2004). Often the probabilities are based 
on statistics and tools that are used to calculate the risk levels. Therefore, including the uncertainties 
related to given activities allows the risk analysis process to dive deeper into the understanding, the 
causes and the consequences of a certain event or activity. Accurate risk estimation cannot be 
measures, it is therefore important to involve all uncertainties that can be involved in unwanted 
activities. Therefore, the importance of definitions like risk should be stressed in a risk analysis. This 
clarifies for the stakeholders the underlying understanding of the risk concept that has been used 
when preparing and processing a risk analysis. The concept of risk and the risks that are involved in 
different parts of the life cycle of a platform needs to be described in such a way that everyone can 
read it. The description of risk and risks involved should be such that everyone reading the risk 
analysis should understand it. The calculations that are done represent how high the involved risk is 
and the risk analysis concludes based on the numbers that the risk is high (or low), thus are very 
quantitatively.  
 
It is important for both the operator and consulting company to have the same understanding of 
criteria for what is expected from the risk analysis and what the risk analysis should include. Since 
different consulting companies have different approaches to present risk and risk reducing measures 
(Case I and II vs. Case III), the underlying understand of risk has to be established before starting the 
risk analysis process. This can be beneficial for all stakeholders involved and is helpful in the decision 
making process. Therefore, the risk analysis should start in an early phase of the life cycle so that the 
risk analysis can contribute as a decision tool. It would be inconvenient if the risk analysis was 
created in after the decision making process or as only a part of compliance to regulations and rules. 
 
Risk is thus identified through evaluating the risk involved in a certain activity based on previous 
experience and case studies. Through the hazard identification process, all the hazards that can 
contribute to risk are identified. When the hazard, and thus the risk, is considered high and over the 
accepted criteria, risk reducing measures are determined. Nevertheless, the statistics and previous 
case studies have not been mentioned in the risk analyses. This information can be added to the risk 
analysis (as an appendix) to ensure that the readers understand the process that has been used. In 
addition, no comparisons have been documented through the risk analysis regarding similar 
operations, activities or modifications in similar platforms or situations in the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf. Nevertheless, examples and analysis from other industries, like the air line industry, can be 
used to learn from.  
 
It is crucial to define the focus related to the reactions and understanding of the people that are 
being exposed to a certain risk situation. These are the personnel are exposed to the risk scenarios 
identified in the risk analyses. While experts like to rely on statistics and available technical data, the 
people exposed are not as comfortable with previous data that is taken into new risk analysis. Their 
perceptions might be based on other values and philosophies and their own experience. Personnel 
working in areas that have higher occurrence values related to hazards and risks are more exposed, 
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and may thus react differently. This indicates that a (quantitative) risk analysis is not enough. A more 
comprehensive qualitative risk analysis should play a bigger role in the risk analysis performed for the 
oil industry in Norway. Especially in the early stages of the risk analysis, due to the fact that 
qualitative risk analysis includes different methods and views that can reflect differently on a risk 
analysis. The quantitative risk analysis focuses more on the statistics and calculations that result in 
numbers and more statistics. If for instance, the RAC limit is set to 10 and the calculations show that 
they are less than 10, doesn’t mean that the activity is as safe. The understanding and perception of 
that certain activity might be much broader when consulted with the personnel working onsite; they 
may have other perceptions both on the causes and on the consequences related to given activities 
(Aven, Vinnem and Vollen, 2006).  
 
3.1.3 Risk reducing measures 
 
The risk reducing measures have been presented as ALARP measures indicating that the risk should 
be reduced to as low as reasonably practicable, in all three cases. The ALARP principle has been used 
as a method and tool for reducing the risk as low as reasonably possible, by the consulting companies 
that prepare and use the risk analysis. After the ALARP process has been evaluated the chosen 
measures are discussed. In for instance Case I, ALARP evaluations have been carried out to 
demonstrate the effect of new installations, relocating equipment, removing equipment, etc. Aker 
Solutions MMO evaluates the results from the safety evaluations in their formal ALARP evaluations 
process which also includes cost aspects. The measures are presented and the consequences of 
implementing the measures have been calculated in relation to the risk involved for the personnel, 
main safety functions and the potential for major accidents. Afterwards a short conclusion is given on 
how high the risk is when implementing the ALARP measures. The recommended measures will then 
be further evaluated and implemented by the operator company, meaning that the operator 
company will be in charge of selecting and implementing risk reducing measures. The informant from 
the operating company, discussed that the measures selected by the operating company can differ 
from the measures that have been suggested by the consulting company in the risk analysis. The risk 
analysis only works as a suggestion, the decision making lies in the hands of the operating company.  
This process of determining and selecting risk reducing measures should be done in cooperation with 
the consulting companies, based on the regulations. But in Norway, the operating company is not 
required to do so. The same process has been used for Case III. 
 
Case II starts with presenting the defined danger- and accident situations. The EPA evaluates these 
situations in relations with the risk involved. Hence, the risk results are discussed and the FAR values 
have been calculated for each danger- and accident situation. The results are further compared with 
the other Sleipner platforms i.e. SLT and SLR. The FAR values for the personnel involved in the 
different locations on the platform and the loss of main safety functions are further analyzed to set 
the recommended measures to reduce the consequences. Based on the calculated risk levels for the 
Sleipner field the risk reducing measures are presented. The Sleipner operations are examined to 
determine the alternative risk reducing measures; in the TRA alternatives have been suggested. This 
is very positive and will contribute more as a decision making tool for the operating company, then 
having only one risk reducing measures and no further alternatives. In addition, the implementation 
process for implementing the recommended risk reducing measures have been estimated (provided 
that the benefits are considered to be greater that the disadvantages). The risk reducing measures 
have been evaluated for situations of fire, explosions, dropped objects etc, with respect to the ALARP 
principle. Risk analysis doesn’t always have enough emphasises and focus on the uncertainties that 
may occur from implementing the recommended risk reducing measures. The uncertainties with 
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both risk and risk reducing measures should be involved in risk analysis (Aven, Vinnem, 2007).                 
However, this has not been the case for the case studies used for this analysis.  
 
In Case I and III, alternative risk reducing measures have not been given; only one risk reducing 
measure for each potential unwanted event or activity. Giving alternative risk reducing measures (if 
possible), can establish a list of most prioritized measures that the operating company can consider. 
Also, a panel of experts should evaluate the recommended measures to determine the consequences 
of the recommended measures.  This evaluation and discussion should be documented for further 
analysis and to be able to use it in other cases as well as documenting which measures have been 
implemented. These measures are often determined by experts that have used the same measures 
before.  Often the encouragement from operator companies is lacking on reducing the risk even 
more and using other (new) tools and methods to determine new measures. Risk reducing measures 
are often based on traditions (Preventor, 2010).  
 
Since the risk reducing measures often are based on statistics and previously determined measures, 
the focus is often on the major events and activities that can contribute to risk and measures to 
reduce the risk. These major activities often include accidents that are related to fire, explosions, 
leaks etc., these hazards are obviously of importance. However, the smaller incidents, accidents and 
the working environment could also be taken into consideration. This can be achieved by 
implementing a more qualitative analysis to include all the aspects that can contribute to risk related 
to for instance the personnel. The most comprehensive approach is to create a checklist of elements 
that should be included in a risk analysis (Pham, 2011). This document can be implemented and 
updated throughout every risk analysis process. In addition, changes and new implementations to 
the list can be updated. Thus, the risk analysis process becomes more clearly.  
 
Through having an overview, new measures should be considered instead of always relying on the 
traditional measures. The group of experts that are determining these risk reducing measures should 
contain a well put together group with both experts from the operator side as well as from the 
consulting company’s side. Alternative approaches and methods are not taken into considerations 
and the risk reducing measures often imply the same measure implementation. Different expertise 
should be involved in the process of determining measures to find the best suitable measure in 
addition to finding alternatives. Focus should be more given on finding measures that are best for the 
personnel related to health, safety and the environment, considering the fact that the financial and 
time consuming aspects should not be a limitation.  
 
The determination process of risk reducing measures also includes determining the consequences of 
these measures. As in the case studies used for this thesis, most of the risk analyses do contain a 
separate part that is concerned with the consequences of the risk reducing process. However, this 
part of the risk analysis can be improved by implementing aspects as how the risk reducing measures 
contribute in reducing the consequences as well as how risk will be reduced after the measures have 
been implementing, i.e. a table that contains information regarding (NORSOK Z013, 2010): 
 
- The suggested risk reducing measure to reduce risk in a given situation or activity 
- The new risk picture that initiates that the risk is reduced based on the recommended risk 
reducing measure  
- The alternative approaches/measures that can be taken to reduce the risk 
- And with time, who should implement the risk reducing measure (responsibility) and the 
follow up program regarding whether the risk reducing measure has been implemented, by 
who, when and how the risk has been reduced 
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The key aspect with regards to risk, risk acceptance criteria and risk reducing measures, and for that 
matter other aspects of a risk analysis, is the documentation that enables understanding and support 
in the decision making processes. Documentation is important both before starting the risk analysis 
process, during the risk analysis process and after the risk analysis process, which enables a 
procedure for how the risk analysis process is.  
 
3.2 Improvement potentials 
 
Through reading and analyzing the three case studies, an understanding was built on how a risk 
analysis is demonstrated in the oil industry. Even though the risk analyses differ in being quantitative, 
total- or concept risk analysis, the risk identification was rather similar (especially Case I and III). Most 
of the knowledge used in the risk analysis is based on experience, models and statistics. In this 
subsection a more general overview is given of the improvements that can be considered in a risk 
analysis; 
 
 Go beyond the minimum requirements: first of all, the risk analyses used in the three cases 
indicate that the regulations and standards have been used and followed. However, the 
operating and consulting companies should try and push the requirements that are set as 
minimum requirements. For instance, by implementing and having more focus on the ALARP 
principle to reduce the risk as low as reasonably practicable.  
 
 Documentation: evidently, the criteria from the PSA shall be followed, but also the internal 
criteria that the operating company has, needs to be up to date and followed, as well as 
documented. Thus, documentation is a very important part of any process, especially the 
underlying attention and approach that was undertaken before starting the risk analysis 
process (the base case). Better documentation is also necessary during and after the risk 
analysis process including (Pham, 2011): 
o the identification of RAC and of the risk reducing measures both quantitatively and 
qualitatively 
o evaluate the risk reducing measures individually before implementation  
o cost benefit analysis for the risk reducing measures 
o risks involved after the risk reducing have been implemented and  
o how will the risk be reduced if the recommended risk reducing measures should be 
implemented 
 
 Follow up documentation: with regards to what risk reducing measures have been selected 
to implement, by whom, when, how etc., should be included in the risk analysis. The 
documentations can be set together to get an overview of what has been done.  
 
 Cost effective measures: by being oriented to meet the pre-determined RAC, the cost 
effective solutions and measures might be prioritized and other important aspects, like the 
environment can become second priority. Acceptability of operations with respect to 
environment risk is more seen as a political process and the acceptance criteria are not as 
important as they should be. Often the pre-defined criteria are used for driving the decision 
making process. However, through replacing this approach with an other approach that 
highlights risk characteristics and evaluations, the risk analysis will include more focus on the 
drive for risk reducing measures and the balance between costs and benefits. The regulations 
from the Norwegian PSA underline the risk reducing principles, but the focus hasn’t been as 
much as wanted from the oil industry (Aven, Vinnem, 2007).  
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 Not relying on old cases: to be able to accomplish the demand and acceptance criteria, 
NORSOK Z-013 (2010) can be used as a guideline. NORSOK Z-013 states that the FAR value for 
personnel on the installation should be less than 10. Therefore, the traditional approach can 
not be used as the only approach for every element in the risk analysis; other (updated) 
approaches, technology or tools should be considered. When the RAC have been 
determined, the risk analysis process can start with the risk identifications and the risk 
reducing measures. The knowledge that is required to prepare and create a risk analysis has 
to be improved and investigated before the risk analysis process can start. The experience 
based approach is often used in the oil industry, as well as previously created risk analyses 
are often used. Risk reducing measures should be implemented as new single cases, instead 
of using a large amount of information based on previous cases (Preventor, 2006). This 
should be implemented with the principle that sets the intolerable risk and a limit to the risk 
that can be negligible, which sets the interval in between the ALARP area (Aven, Vinnem, 
2007).   
 
 Involve stakeholders: Often the involvement of the personnel is not taken into the risk 
analysis process. The employers that are working on the platform itself know the risks 
involved. Therefore, the participation of the on-site personnel is crucial to include all the 
aspects that are required to complete a risk analysis. Thus, when every given scenario is 
identified and every possible risk is identified, the risk analysis process will then be more 
thorough and the risk that is involved can be reduced with risk reducing measures that can 
be implemented. Thus, the risk reducing measures are then based on the risks that have 
been identified by including the personnel. The personnel can be from the operator company 
or from the contracting companies that are working or have worked on the platforms. 
Through involvement of different personnel with various experiences the risk identification 
picture can be improved and optional risk reducing measures can de recommended and 
implemented (Hansson, 2003). When risk has to be managed and analyzed the biggest focus 
is obviously on the health and safety of the personnel, therefore involving the personnel 
before starting any quantitative risk analysis might complement if not complete the risk 
analysis process (Pham, 2011). 
 
 Making risk analyses understandable: The risk analysis process has potential for 
improvements and through implementing improvements along the risk analysis processes, 
the content of a risk analysis can be more understandable for all stakeholders involved. A risk 
analysis should include a solid scientific basis that determines how the risk analysis process is 
evaluated. Through this scientific basis the process can be clarified, and all readers of the risk 
analysis will be able to understand the process (Aven, 2011). Often simplicity is the key. After 
talking to some of the informants, it became clear that the risk analysis not always is as clear 
as they would have liked. The risk analysis that is presented is often read by others, for 
instance contractors that are given the task to for instance further evaluate the ALARP 
values. Therefore, the risk analysis should be readable for all the stakeholders that are 
involved, especially the authorities (Aven, 2012). This is not always the case and risk analyses 
are found hard to understand (Preventor, 2010). The ALARP is an important part of a risk 
analysis. Aven and Vinnem (2007) believe that the authorities should be more closely 
involved in the ALARP processes and how they are used in the oil industry. 
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 Uncertainty: is often a word that is not used in risk analyses. However, the interpretations 
and the measurements of identified hazards, risk calculations, fire and explosion simulations 
etc. should document which uncertainties that are taken into account and used in the risk 
analysis. This is also the case for the probabilities of the risks involved (Pham, 2011). In the 
three cases studies that are used in this thesis, the uncertainties, probabilities and risks are 
not further evaluated or explained. When for instance, it is given that a possibility might 
occur for an explosion, further explanations and assumptions are not given. The probability 
and uncertainties that are involved can be explained to make it clearer. However, this does 
mean that the risk analysis in itself will be more thorough; simplicity in presentation of risk 
can be used to make the material better understandable. The uncertainty that might be 
involved should be further discussed and assessed to complete the risk analysis. When a 
reader of the risk analysis is not satisfied with the risk analysis and feels information is 
missing it means that the risk analysis has potential for improvements. To be able to include 
these elements in a risk analysis, the analysts should have the right background within risk 
and uncertainty involved with risk. As pointed out by Aven (Pham, 2011), risk analysts often 
have a “poor background”. The right education and training is thus required to communicate 
the risk picture and the uncertainties involved, to create a judgment (Preventor, 2006). This 
indicates that the risk picture should be extended with regards to implementing all risk 
analysis methods that can be used. The Sensitivity analyses that are presented in the three 
case studies do not contain diverse uncertainty analysis. The Sensitivity analysis can raise the 
awareness regarding the uncertainties, and not restrict to the average analysis that can be 
made on the probabilities involves.  
 
 Inform about the limitations: in the decision making process, it is important to use the risk 
analysis, but it is also important to inform that the risk analysis is based on assumptions that 
can be uncertain or limited. This information can then be taken into consideration when 
using the risk analysis as a tool in the decision making process. This understanding, that 
uncertainty is still available, is crucial to have in the risk analysis process.  
 
 Updating tools and knowledge: the assumptions that are made in the more traditional risk 
analysis methods cannot be used on these new more complex systems. Therefore, not all 
factors that might contribute to risk can be determined and thus further evaluated. The 
contribution to for instance human errors can be difficult to be modeled when the 
complexity of the system and the risks involved are uncertain. For instance, the STAMP 
(Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes) model is an accident model that is argued 
by Leveson (2004) for safety engineering and risk management. System theory is a beneficial 
when analyzing potential accidents, where accidents occur from failure and insufficient 
interactions among systems are not fully handled by the control system. Expertise plays a 
major role when determining both risk and risk reducing measures. The right timing, with 
regards to starting the risk analysis process early in the design or modification process, plays 
a big part in how effective the risk analysis can be. Often the risk analysis is prepared during 
or even after certain events (for instance modifications) have taken place (Kristensen, 2012). 
The expertise and right timing on starting the risk analysis process can determine the 
effectiveness and knowledge needed to prepare a satisfying risk analysis that is understood 
by all the stakeholders involved (Leveson, 2004).    
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 Not limiting the risk acceptance criteria: as required from the Norwegian PSA, the risk 
reducing measures should be determined before starting the risk analysis. As Aven (Pham, 
2011) argues, is t necessary to specify these strong limitations and accepted criteria? 
Through setting limits to what is accepted, the company is restricted from obtaining the 
desired and maybe best suitable results. This might result in weak limits that have been 
determined, and further used in the risk analysis process. Thus, the RAC are concentrated on 
obtaining the minimum safety standards that has been accepted, not giving opportunities for 
improving and reducing the risk when possible.  
 
 Human aspects that contribute to accidents: risk analyses don’t focus as much on the 
qualitative side. Nevertheless this element and other elements are important to include in a 
risk analysis or in a risk analysis process, like: 
o Safety Management, to create safety culture and order 
o Acceptable Risk with the criteria that is assumed acceptable and its margin 
o Risk Matrix for including the probabilities and consequences before and after an 
potential event or accident occurs 
o Incident investigation reports from incidents in that area or with that element that 
contributes to risk 
o Uncertainty and Reliability analysis, also focus on humans and human-errors that can 
contribute to risk 
 
 Risk analysis as a decision tool: operator companies have to be cautious, to not interpret risk 
analysis as evidence of no need for change or further evaluate where needed. But 
implementing change can be challenging for people and companies are often comfortable 
with the approaches that they are taking and have been taken in the past (Aven, Vinnem, 
2007). Therefore, the risk analysis needs to be used as a decision making tool that needs 
constant updating and new expertise. In addition, risk analysis should not be used as 
validation of activities that already have been implemented before the risk analysis has 
started. The risk analysis should be ready and used as a decision making tool before starting 
activities like maintenance and modifications.  
 
 Underlying understanding of risk reducing measures: that are determined need to be more 
detailed, meaning that the evaluations that are taken for determining the risk reducing 
measures should also be included. The steps that are undertaken to determine the risk 
reducing measures can be both qualitative and quantitative. In the three cases the 
recommended risk reducing measures are presented, but the underlying understanding of 
how they reached their conclusions is lacking. Through explaining and documenting this, the 
risk analysis can illustrate the underlying strategies that are undertaken, in order to improve 
where needed. Often experience and previously used measures are being used to determine 
these risk reducing measures; it is up to the operator company to further implement the risk 
reducing measures. An evaluation process of the recommended risk reducing measures 
should be carried out (and documented) by for instance using the cost- benefit matrix where 
the relationship between the costs and the benefits are illustrated as recommended in 
NORSOK Z013 (2010). This is a very comprehensive process that should be discussed with the 
operating company. When the processed and risk analysis methods are used, and their 
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underlying understanding are documented, it will make it more understandable when a new 
risk analysis is prepared. Since the PSA doesn’t give any specific demands regarding how to 
accomplish for instance Framework Regulation (2001) § 9 regarding the risk reducing 
measures, the operating company should at least have a process for determining the RAC 
and risk reducing measures. As Aven (Pham, 2011) points out, the validation of risk analysis 
methods is a crucial but complex issue. To deliver the results in a adequate and trustworthy 
manner to the operating company (and other stakeholders), it is crucial to advert the minds 
and process that lies underneath the risk management and risk results in that are presented 
in the risk analysis. The clarity on the consultants that are preparing the risk analysis and how 
the group is put together also plays a significant role. 
 
 Ordering the risk reducing measures: as described in the literature review, the risk reducing 
measures should be ordered with regards to alternatives, prioritizations and the impact of 
the risk reducing measures. Meaning whether their impact is to prevent, control or mitigate 
the effects of an accident or activity (ISO 13702, 1999). 
 
 Through combining the qualitative- and quantitative risk analysis, the risk analysis will 
become complete, valid and more reliable (Holme, Solvang, 2004).  And, even though the 
companies preparing the risk analysis are trying to improve and implement new aspects to 
the risk analysis process they have been using the last couple of years, no changes have been 
made (informs the Informant from one of the consulting companies preparing the risk 
analysis); hence, the risk analysis has remained the same. 
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Section 4: Conclusion 
 
Regulations have been determined by the authorities and they shall be followed. The case studies 
fulfill the requirements that are given in the regulations. Also, standards have been used as guidance 
to fulfilling the regulations. Since risk cannot be eliminated it has to be managed, through 
determining risk acceptance criteria before starting the risk reducing process, where the accepted 
limits are determined. Through hazards identification the risks can be identified, this identification 
process is determined by what normally is a group of experienced consultants. The risk analysis 
simplifies risk to probability and consequence; the causes and uncertainties related to risk have not 
been implemented nor documented in the risk analysis. The risk acceptance criteria should be used 
with care, fulfilling the limits or criteria does not indicate that the risks are accepted. The underlying 
understanding of the accepted criteria should also be implemented and documented in the risk 
analysis to demonstrate the awareness with regards to risk.  
 
The industry and technology is changing therefore, risk cannot be identified and limited to traditional 
methods and techniques. Hence, changes with regards to implementing new methods and 
techniques for identifying risk and risk reducing measures in the risk analysis process are difficult to 
adapt. Stakeholders and companies that are involved in preparing the risk analysis should go beyond 
the minimum regulations, to reduce the risk to ALARP. From the case studies used in this thesis it can 
be concluded that the risk analyses don’t go beyond the minimum requirements that are determined 
by the authorities.  
 
The risk analysis only displays the findings, calculation and their conclusions, without demonstrating 
the underlying understanding of what risk is and what contributes to that risk. Even though the 
ALARP principle has been used when determining the risk reducing measures, no further 
explanations have been given in the risk analyses regarding the basis and underlying understanding, 
that have contributed in identifying risk and risk reducing measures. The risk analyses are based on 
experts, previous case studies and statistics, i.e. the risk analysis is restricted to the expertise that is 
available for a given risk analysis. Through a qualitative risk analysis, a more comprehensive risk 
picture can be established, taking into account underlying factors influencing risk by including several 
important personnel and stakeholders.  
 
Thus, further development and more comprehensive documentation related to the identification of 
risk and risk reducing measures should be improved, as well as the focus on risk related to HSE 
should be increased. 
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